

WILTSHIRE POLICE



Via email



Police Headquarters

London Road
DEVIZES
Wiltshire
SN10 2DN

disclosure@wiltshire.police.uk

Date: 24th February 2026

Our ref: FOI 2025-996

Reply contact name:

Dear,

I write in connection with your request for information dated 20th October 2025 regarding correspondence and communications between Wiltshire Police and the NPCC Central Referral Unit. Please accept my apologies for the late response.

I am required by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to handle all requests in a manner that is blind as to the identity and motives of the requestor. Any information released as a response to a request is regarded as being published and therefore in the public domain without caveat.

Your request for information has now been considered and I am able to respond as follows.

You wrote:

I am writing to request all written digital correspondence between (1) your force's team responsible for addressing and responding to freedom of information requests and (2) the National Police Chiefs' Council's (NPCC) central referral unit (CRU) in September 2025.

Our response:

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), redactions have been made by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 40(2) – Personal data
Section 31(1) – Law Enforcement

Information which constitutes personal data is exempt under Section 40(2) of the FOIA if it relates to a third party, and the disclosure to the public would contravene the data protection principles set out in Section 34 of the Data Protection Act 2018 and Article 5 of the GDPR.

Section 40 is an absolute exemption and therefore there is no requirement to articulate the harm or conduct a Public Interest test.

Keeping Wiltshire Safe

Section 31 is a qualified prejudice-based exemption and therefore requires Wiltshire Police to establish the harm in disclosure, along with the public interest favouring and against disclosure. Please see the below harm and balance tests. For email correspondence please find them at the end of this letter.

Harm test

The Freedom of Information Act plays an important role in preventing crime, particularly through its impact on transparency, accountability and public oversight. FOI legislation allows members of the public and watchdog organisations to access records related to matters including police conduct and judicial decisions. This transparency helps expose misconduct, bias, or systematic failures, which can lead to reforms that prevent future crimes.

Accordingly, the NPFDU acts as a national coordination body in providing professional advice and support for forces and stakeholders in all matters relating to both freedom of information (FOI) and data protection (DP) within the UK police service.

In order to do this, there are established internal processes and channels by which the forces and the NPFDU maintain contact so that information, advice and support can be given without disruption. Accordingly, some of the information requested contains contact details that would, if released, provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the NPFDU with information that would assist them in this endeavour.

Public Interest Test

Factors favouring disclosure

Wiltshire Police is a public authority and is ultimately accountable to the general public. When any request for information is made to the police, it is important that Wiltshire Police is transparent, where possible, in responding to that request for information. Disclosing all information held without redaction, would reinforce the forces commitment to transparency with the general public.

Factors against disclosure

The release of the internal contact details for the NPFDU would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the NPFDU, Wiltshire Police and the Police Service more generally, with information that would assist them to do so. By disclosing information which has the potential to result in vast amounts of correspondence being received would impede upon the resources of these members of staff and cause disruption to the work of Wiltshire Police and the NPFDU.

Balance Test

Whilst there is a public interest in better informing the public as to the internal mechanisms used within the force, this must be balanced with the need to ensure that the appropriate channels are used for contact and that internal mailboxes are not compromised in any way.

Exemptions applied:

Section 40(2) - Personal Information
Section 31(1) – Law Enforcement

I am satisfied that all the relevant information has been passed to me and considered in the light of your request within the time constraints applicable under the legislation.

Wiltshire Police would like to thank you for the interest that you have shown in the Force.

Yours sincerely

Force Disclosure Decision Maker

Wiltshire Police offers a re-examination of your case under its review procedure.



Force Disclosure Unit

Wiltshire Police HQ, London Road, Devizes, Wiltshire SN10 2DN



Freedom of Information Request Appeals Procedure

1. Who Can Ask for a Review

Keeping Wiltshire Safe

Any person who has requested information from Wiltshire Police, which has been dealt with under the Freedom of Information Act, is entitled to complain and request an internal review, if they are dissatisfied with the response they received.

2. How to Request a Review

Requests for review of a Freedom of Information request must be made in writing to the:

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police Headquarters,
London Road, Devizes,
Wiltshire,
SN10 2DN

Email at disclosure@wiltshire.police.uk.

The reference number, date of the request and details of why the review is being requested must be included. Requests for review should be brought to the attention of the Force Disclosure Unit within 20 working days of the Force's response to the original FoI request.

3. Review Procedure

Receipt of a request for review will be acknowledged in writing to include confirmation of the reasons for the review. The review will be conducted by another Decision Maker, who is independent from the original Decision Maker. The Force Disclosure Unit will set a target date for a response. The response will be made as soon as is practicable with the intention to complete the review within twenty working days. In more complex cases the review may take up to 40 working days.

The Independent Decision Maker will conduct a review of the handling of the request for information and of decisions taken, including decisions taken about where the public interest lies in respect of exempt information where applicable. The review enables a re-evaluation of the case, taking into account the matters raised by the complaint.

4. Conclusion of the Appeal

On completion of the review the Independent Decision Maker will reply to the complainant with the result of the review. If the complainant is still dissatisfied following the review they should contact the Information Commissioner to make an appeal. The Information Commissioner can be contacted via the following details:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Tel: 01625 545 700
Fax: 01625 524 510
Email: mail@ico.gsi.gov.uk

Please note that the ICO's offices will be closed for the foreseeable future and are therefore unable to receive correspondence via post.

If you should wish you contact them, please visit <https://ico.org.uk/global/contact-us/>

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5103/T - Software Products used in Operations and Investigations - Including advice
Date: 02 September 2025 12:50:35
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5103/T
Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

A list of all software products and services used in operations by the force between 1 January 2023 and 31 July 2025, including those products and services procured under the Strategic Partnership Arrangement 2024 (SPA24) and the Digital Transformation Arrangement 21 (DTA21), as well as other routes, such as RM6098 and through Crown Commercial Services

Clarification from applicant

To clarify, by "services" I'm referring only to software, and by "operations" I'm referring only to policing enforcement and investigation activities, such as public order events and criminal investigations."

CRU Advice:

As the question asks specifically for software *used in investigations* over the given time period, it is our belief that the request will exceed the cost limits of the act. We feel it's unlikely your systems will be formatted in a way that will make location and retrieval of the information possible without a manual review of each and every criminal investigation that has taken place in a 2.5 year period across the entire force.

If s12 is relevant then we see no issue in responding that way. Where you deem it feasible to do so we recommend you advise the applicant how best to refine their request.

If cost is not a factor for your force, please let us know. In such a case, and as you will be aware, the CRU have previously provided guidance on certain types of software which are not suitable for release. However in order to advise accurately how to answer this request where cost is not relevant, we would need to know what is held by forces. Any comments made by your force IT teams identifying harm would also be helpful if obtained.

Therefore, if you are not issuing a s12 cost refusal, please come back to the CRU with the above information and we will aim to assist further.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

📧 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS



--	--

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: OS - CRU 25/5110 - Anduril Industries
Date: 03 September 2025 07:20:59
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the
CRU

Dear All,

Apologies for the wait on this. Please see below advice:

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005110/S

Referred by: National

Applicant's request

1. Please provide copies of the following documents and/or reports relating to Anduril Industries tools (Lattice OS, Command and Control, drones/UAV/UAS, Pulsar, Wisp, sentry towers, etc.) that your police force has access to, whether they are internal or external:

- *Data Protection Assessments*
- *Memorandums of Understanding between your police force and other organisations*
- *Equality Impact Assessments*
- *Internal data retention/deletion policies*
- *Pilot/trial scheme evaluation reports*
- *Comparison reports with any potential alternatives*

2. Please also declare any future plans (with specific dates, if possible) to test, trial, and/or deploy tools from Anduril Industries including any internal/external reports which contain information on this matter.

CRU Advice

As always, the following is given on the proviso that s12 is not relevant.

This is the first FOI request we appear to have received in respect of ANDURIL technologies. Our understanding is that ANDURIL Industries is a defence technology company that develops advanced autonomous systems integrated through its AI-powered software platform, **Lattice OS**, which brings together data from sources such as sensors, drones and vehicles.

We are not aware of any forces using ANDURIL, but it would appear it is contracted by the [Home Office](#) (border security), and the MoD, about which there is some information available including via [WDTK](#). It is essentially military grade technology, but it does appear to have cross over capability into law enforcement and public safety. It is already used to assist border security, but it could be also be used for protection of critical infrastructure (nuclear power stations as an example), public event security, search and rescue.

Whilst we remain applicant and motive blind, it is easy to find articles that discuss the use of ANDURIL technologies:

[The UK's AI Borders: Anduril's Autonomous Surveillance Towers - Migrants' Rights Network](#)
[Britain's dangerous £62m gamble on Anduril: the rise of AI warfare in UK Defence - AOA](#)

Overall, ANDURIL seems straightforward enough as a capability. It is being used, but not in policing as far as we know.

For Q1, the request is asking for copies of documents and/or reports forces have **access to**, which is not strictly a question about whether or not you hold information. Obviously, if you hold such documents under FOI terms, then you have access also. However, having access to something, but not holding the information for the use by your own force, is not information held for the purpose of FOI per se. For example, all forces will have access to [the ANDURIL website](#), but that does not constitute information held unless your force saves the information from it and uses it for its own purpose. Simple access to information is not enough to qualify as information held.

More likely, and in accordance with what some practitioners have told us, the response to Q1 is "No

Information Held” across the board. As I say, we are not aware of any forces using ANDURIL technologies at this present moment in time, and we see no overriding reason to cite NCND on the basis of this request. If any forces are, then please let the CRU know.

Q2 – Again we suspect that this is NIH. Please let us know if you have questions or concerns.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]

Freedom of Information Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

National Police Chiefs Council

📮 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5136/C - Abduction and kidnap statistics - Including Advice
Date: 04 September 2025 12:30:56
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message. **We believe this request has been circulated nationally and as such advice is being provided on that basis. There is no need to let us know you have this request unless you have a specific query about it which is not answered within the below advice.**

Our reference: 25/5136/C
Referred by: Dorset Police

Applicant's request:

I'm writing to you to request data on police recorded offences of child abduction and kidnapping for the latest financial year 2024/25.

Specifically, I'd be very grateful if you could supply the following information:

1. From 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025, how many crimes¹ of child abduction by a parent (Home Office classification² 13/01) were recorded in Dorset Police?
2. From 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025, how many crimes¹ of child abduction by other persons (Home Office classification² 13/02) were recorded in Dorset Police?
3. From 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025, how many crimes¹ of kidnapping (Home Office classification² 36/01) – when the victim was aged under 18 at the time of the offence – were recorded in Dorset Police? Please note: I only want to collect data on 36/01 offences; not the other 36 sub-categories (36/02, 36/03, 36/04 etc.).

For each of these three figures (questions 1, 2 and 3 above) please can you indicate how many of the offences were flagged as Child Sexual Abuse, and how many were flagged as Child Sexual Exploitation³.

¹I'm looking for information on crimes recorded rather than 'incidents'.

²Home Office classification number refers to the Counting Rules:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counting-rules-for-recorded-crime>

³As per Home Office Counting Rules (2024/25), page 26:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67ee9b2a199d1cd55b48c769/crime-recording-rules-for-frontline-officers-and-staff-2025_26-april-2025-update.pdf

CRU Advice:


Advice is provided with the usual s12 and s21 considerations in mind.

For the statistical data requested, local assessment to ensure disclosure would not identify an individual or undermine an investigation is advised.

In addition, and irrespective of what else may or may not be held, a partial s23(5) has been requested for inclusion by stakeholders, please can this be incorporated into your response. **There is no need to send us draft responses.**

Having conducted an internet search, I note a number of forces have already responded to this request and that in the majority of cases, s23(5) has not been included. If that is the case for your force, to ensure consistency with others and any future requests, we recommend you make the original response erroneous and re issue it with the partial s23(5) included. Please note, this has no impact on any disclosure of information/exemptions cited for the request.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

📧 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: FW: CRU 01/CRF/25/005163/F - Polygraph Testing - Advice Included
Date: 04 September 2025 12:03:47
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)
[Advice for Polygraph FOI - 56023 70023 and 73023 - OS.msg](#)

Good afternoon all,
Recirculating the below in case this was not originally received.
Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS



From: NPCC CRU Mailbox
Sent: 02 September 2025 07:37
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005163/F - Polygraph Testing - Advice Included

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005163/F
Referred by: Staffordshire Police

Applicant's request:

I am conducting research into the use of polygraph testing by UK police forces, particularly in the management and monitoring of sex offenders, and wish to better understand the scope, outcomes, and governance of such practices.
Please treat this as a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Request

Please provide the following information:

1. Implementation timeline
 - a. The month and year in which your force first began using polygraph tests in relation to sex offenders.
 - b. Whether usage has expanded since initial implementation, and if so, how and when.
2. Volume of testing
 - a. Annual totals of polygraph tests conducted since implementation.
 - b. Cumulative total number of tests administered to date.
3. Types of subjects
 - a. The number of convicted sex offenders (e.g., under licence, probation, or other) tested each year, versus suspects not yet convicted.
 - b. Annual breakdowns where possible.
4. Outcomes of testing

- a. The number of tests leading to further disclosures (e.g., admissions of reoffending, breach of licence conditions, or other risk-related information).
- b. The number of tests resulting in actual action (e.g., changes to licence conditions, recall to custody, initiation of investigations).
- c. Any data on the percentage of tests resulting in significant disclosures or actions.

5. Purpose and procedure

- a. The stated purpose of polygraph testing within your force's sex offender management or investigative processes.
- b. Who conducts the tests (e.g., trained police officers, probation staff, or external examiners).
- c. Whether the tests are voluntary or mandatory, and under what circumstances.
- d. The training, standards, or qualifications required for individuals conducting polygraph examinations.
- e. The oversight mechanisms or quality assurance processes in place to ensure polygraph use is compliant and effective.

6. Legal and oversight considerations

- a. Whether polygraph results are admissible as evidence in court within your force's jurisdiction.
- b. Any legal or practical limitations your force has encountered regarding polygraph use (e.g., accuracy concerns, legal challenges, or statutory restrictions).
- c. Details of any internal or external evaluations, audits, or research into the effectiveness or reliability of polygraph testing in relation to sex offenders, including copies or references to such reports.

7. Policy and guidance

- a. Copies of any policies, procedures, training manuals, or internal guidance documents relating to the use of polygraph tests in relation to sex offenders.
- b. If full copies cannot be provided, the titles, authors, and dates of the documents.

CRU Advice:

Advice is provided on the assumption that all the requested information can be located and retrieved within the cost threshold. Where this is not the case, s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you advise the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so.

Q1 - Each force will need to locally assess the information they hold relevant to these questions. However we see no harm in disclosing this figure if held.

b - As the applicant has only specified the time frame of 'When your force first began using polygraph tests in relation to sex offenders' this may go over cost depending on when your force started using polygraphs. If it does not then we see no harm in a yes or no answer on the first part of the question but a partial NCND s23(5), s24(2), s30(3), s31(3) will be required for the second half of it in respect of any information held about the how and when uses of other polygraph functions that may capture CT related functions.

If your force does not use polygraph testing and have no polygraph trained officers or staff, you can disclose that you do not conduct polygraph testing of sex offenders and DA, however the partial NCND will still need to be applied for the CT related functions.

Q2 – We see no harm in these figures being disclosed as a whole

Q3 – Again we see no harm in these figures being disclosed as a whole.

Q4 -It is our understanding that forces do not routinely use Polygraph tests for investigative purposes. However, this is not to say that they haven't. Regardless, as the applicant has been broad in that the questions relating to "any further disclosures", Subject to local assessment, there is no immediate harm in providing statistical data requested, along with the partial NCND mentioned to mask any CT investigations

Forces that do not conduct Polygraph testing can state No Information held in respect of sex offenders and DA offenders, and add the partial NCND that no other information is held relative to terrorism.

Q5(a)- This is simply an explanation of why polygraphs are used as the applicant has not been very specific

b-This can be disclosed but no ranks given

c- We see no harm in this being disclosed if held

d&e – This will need through local assessment and may be likely to require the partial NCND as it may capture CT related functions within this search

Q6 – Have your legal team areas discussed any harm that they see in these questions. We would advise practitioners to first seek out there comments. We envision that Q6(a) will be acceptable to be disclosed and Qb & Qc will need to have the partial NDND but this will need to be evaluated by your team.

Q7 – Please see attached advice 560/23

Please find below a form of words to assist.

Form of words to assist

Force Name can neither confirm nor deny whether it holds any other information that you requested as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters

Section 24(2) – National Security

Section 30(3) – Criminal Investigations

Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement

HARM

The FOI Act is ‘applicant blind’. This means that we cannot, and do not, ask about the motives of anyone who asks for information. In providing a response to one person, we are expressing a willingness to provide the same response to anyone, including those who might represent a threat to the UK.

It is public knowledge that not all Police forces conduct Polygraph Testing of post-conviction sex offenders, and this extends to the testing of Domestic Abuse (DA) offenders. It is also public knowledge that the 2014 National Policing stance sets out the evidential implications of using Polygraph within the investigation setting:

<https://library.college.police.uk/docs/APPREF/National-Policing-Position-Statement-use-of-Polygraph-May-2014.pdf>

However, modern day policing is intelligence led and this is particularly pertinent with regard to law enforcement, and Counter Terrorism. The public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. As such, confirmation or denial is only possible when doing so would not reveal certain tactics and techniques, the extent to which they may be deployed, and whether information is held that has a bearing on matters of National Security.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level based upon current intelligence, and that threat is currently judged as “SUBSTANTIAL”, meaning that an attack on the UK is likely.

It is well established that police forces use tactics and technology to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour, and it has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.

To confirm or deny that any other information is held in relation to Polygraph testing in circumstances or scenarios beyond sex offender, or DA offender management at force level, would reveal whether the technique has utility beyond post-conviction sex offender, or DA offender testing within the wider Law Enforcement sphere. Notably, to confirm or deny whether any other information is held relevant to Polygraph testing in a Counter Terrorism setting, whether that is a post-conviction terrorist offender, or someone suspected of being so connected with such activities, would reveal whether such techniques are in use as an investigative, and more so, intelligence gathering tactic.

Confirmation or denial across the Police Service would infer that there are gaps within the intelligence picture nationally which, for certain criminal elements and extremists, may embolden them to focus efforts within areas that they deem to be “soft” targets. Any incident that results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.

Public Interest Test

Some of the exemptions in the FOI Act, referred to as ‘qualified exemptions’, are subject to a public interest test (PIT). This test is used to balance the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in

favour of withholding the information, or the considerations for and against the requirement to say whether the information requested is held or not. We must carry out a PIT where we are considering using any of the qualified exemptions in response to a request for information.

The 'public interest' is not the same as what interests the public. In carrying out a PIT we consider the greater good or benefit to the community as a whole if the information is released or not. The 'right to know' must be balanced against the need to enable effective law enforcement and to serve the best interests of the public.

S24(2) - Considerations in favour of confirming or denying the information is held

The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and confirm or deny the requested information is held would allow the public to see where money is being spent and know that forces are doing as much as possible to combat terrorism.

S24(2) - Considerations in favour of neither confirming or denying the information is held

To confirm or deny information is held would render security measures less effective. Any information shared between law enforcement partners (i.e. intelligence) has the potential to cover all aspects of criminal activity, be it threats to life, or intelligence relating to terrorist activity. Confirmation or denial could highlight to those intent on criminality, whether or not information has been shared. Confirming such would dramatically weaken the effectiveness of intelligence led policing. The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with any information, no matter how generic that is.

S30(3) - Considerations in favour of confirming or denying the information is held

There is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that **Force Name** is appropriately and effectively dealing with Counter Terrorism. Confirming or denying whether any other information is held would allow the public to make informed decisions about these matters.

S30(3) - Considerations in favour of neither confirming or denying the information is held

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that **Force Name** is appropriately and effectively dealing with the threat of Terrorism, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations and in maintaining confidence in the Police Service. Any ongoing or future investigations, or operations to protect the security and infrastructure of the UK would be compromised as terrorists could map the level of Counter-Terrorist activity and intelligence sharing across the country, providing them with the knowledge of individual force capability as well as valuable knowledge concerning the vulnerability of individual force areas.

S31(3) - Considerations in favour of confirming or denying the information is held

FORCE NAME has a responsibility to conduct its business in an open and transparent manner. Confirmation or denial of all circumstances related to the use of Polygraph testing would assure the public that the police is committed to combating crime and terrorism. It would also ensure the public that the activities of certain individuals are being monitored by law enforcement so that individuals are aware of the investigative techniques used in order to protect the public, thus leading to better public awareness.

S31(3) - Considerations in favour of neither confirming or denying the information is held

Disclosure of the information, if held, would mean releasing sensitive information into the public domain, which could compromise law enforcement tactics, which could in turn hinder the prevention and detection of crime. To disclose whether information is held in relation to Polygraph Testing, whether by the force itself, or through the provision of information from other Law Enforcement partners in relation to Counter Terrorism would:

- a) allow criminals and extremists to evade prosecution or detection if they believe such practices are not in use for the purpose of seeking intelligence, or;
- b) cause criminals and extremists to alter their behaviour if they become aware of the tactics and techniques the police might employ, and to what extent.

Therefore confirming or denying whether any other information is held could compromise the prevention and detection of crime, which includes Terrorism.

Balancing Test

As evidenced within the harm above, confirming or denying any other information is held relevant to this request would start to indicate levels of specific policing activity at force level, and more broadly from a national perspective in relation to Counter Terrorism matters.

The Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine Law Enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations, and in this case providing assurance that **FORCE NAME** is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by criminal and terrorist activity (either at force level or through the provision of assistance to, or from partners) there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding law enforcement, which by extension includes National Security.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced about such matters, this will only ever be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Matters in relation to crime and terrorism are sensitive issues of intelligence value to those who would do harm, and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation to Polygraph tests and Counter Terrorism would not be in the public interest.

If you need any further advice please let us know.

Kind regards,

[Redacted Signature]

(Pronoun: she/her [why have I put this?](#))

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council
NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

[Redacted Contact Information]

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [Redacted] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: Advice for Polygraph FOI - 560/23, 700/23 and 730/23 - OS

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

Firstly, our sincerest apologies for the long delay in receiving this.

Following on from consultations with National Policing Leads and stakeholders, please see below advice in relation to the following 3 x requests about Polygraph testing.

560/23 [REDACTED] referred to the CRU by 9 forces

700/23 [REDACTED] National

730/23 [REDACTED] National

Polygraph Testing

The decision reached overall is that there needs to be a distinction between whether or not forces are Polygraph testing as a capability, against whether or not any other information is held relevant to Counter Terrorism matters.

7 It is public domain that some forces are using Polygraph testing in respect of post-conviction sex offenders. However, the majority are not.

7 It is public domain that at least one force is trialling tests in relation to Domestic Abuse perpetrators.

7 All forces should neither confirm nor deny that they hold information in respect of Polygraph testing and Counter Terrorism matters.

7 Any information that would undermine the purpose of Polygraph testing, such as the format and techniques of testing, should not be disclosed.

In view of the stance, practitioners may be aware that legislation is now in place that allows for the testing of terrorist offenders out on license. However, this is legislation that places a duty on the Probation Service. But it does not place an obligation on the Police Service to do the same.

Dealing with the requests

Firstly, please find a form of words to assist with the NCND element at the foot of this advice to reflect whether information is held or not in respect of testing and Counter Terrorism. Not whether your force does or does not conduct Polygraph Testing per se.

560/23 [REDACTED]

1. The number of polygraph tests conducted by XXXX Police since 1 January 2018. Please provide figures broken down by calendar year.

2. The number of polygraph tests conducted by XXXX Police for purposes other than sex offender management since 1 January 2018. Please provide figures broken down by calendar year

3. The number of polygraph-trained XXXX Police officers.

4. The number of polygraph-trained XXXX Police staff (excluding officers).

CRU Advice

Forces not using Polygraph can respond that they do not conduct Polygraph testing of sex offenders, and have no Polygraph trained officers or staff. A partial NCND is also required that no other information is held in respect of Polygraph testing and Counter Terrorism matters - by virtue of s23(5), s24(2), s30(3) and s31(3).

Forces using Polygraph:

1 and 2 The police service has avowed testing of sex offenders. A total number of those tests per calendar year, can be disclosed.

In the event that forces have conducted tests on DA offenders, we see no harm there either.

However, the partial NCND is also required in respect of CT matters, regardless as to whether any information is held or not.

Q3 and 4 Ok to disclose.

700/23

1. How many polygraph tests were conducted by the police force for each year between (and including) 2018 and 2022?

2. In 2022, how many polygraph tests were conducted by the police force on people not guilty of charges related to sex offenses, domestic abuse or terrorism?

3. In 2022, how many people formally requested to be removed from the sex offenders register? How many of those people were subsequently given a polygraph test?

CRU Advice

As before, Forces not using Polygraph can respond that they do not conduct Polygraph testing of sex offenders, or DA offenders. A partial NCND is also required that no other information is held relevant to Polygraph testing and CT matters - by virtue of s23(5) s24(2), s30(3) and s31(3).

Forces using Polygraph:

1 As per the advice for 560/23 No harm in respect of testing sex offenders, and DA offenders. The partial NCND is required in relation to Counter Terrorism.

2 According to the results of research commissioned by the NPCC, testing has previously been conducted on persons suspected of committing sexual offences. However, the question asked isn't very clear in that I don't know whether the applicant means the person was tested and then later found not guilty of a charge, or whether they were found not guilty and then subsequently tested?

Overall, the position is not to confirm or deny information relevant to tests of terrorists (whether suspected of such, or post-conviction). However, local assessment in respect of sex offenders, or DA offenders will be required, subject to clarification of the request itself.

3 As this relates only to post-convicted sex offenders who are RSOs, then subject to excess Cost, there is no harm in complying with this request if able to do so.

730/23

1. In the last 6 years, the number of occasions on which an individual suspected of, or charged with an offence but not yet convicted, or who is being investigated by your Force, has been invited, requested or required by your Force to take a polygraph test.
2. In respect of the above, the number of occasions in the last 6 years that an individual suspected of an offence, charged with an offence but not yet convicted or who is being investigated by your Force has in fact taken a polygraph test.
3. The number of occasions in the last 6 years that an individual suspected of an offence, charged with an offence but not yet convicted or who is being investigated by your Force has been invited, requested or required by the force to take a polygraph test for the purposes of assessing the risk those individuals are posing to children.
4. The Force's policy document(s), operational guidance and/or similar document(s) relating to the use of polygraph tests in relation to individuals suspected of an offence, charged with an offence but not yet convicted or under investigation by the Force.
5. The number of occasions in the last 6 years that an individual has been requested or required to take a polygraph test as part of a bail condition or in connection with a community sentence/order.
6. The Force's policy document(s), operational guidance and/or similar document(s) relating to the use of polygraph tests in relation to bail conditions and/or community sentences/orders.
7. The number of occasions in the last 6 years that polygraph testing has been requested or required for any individuals/circumstances other than for the management of sexual offenders, terrorism offenders, domestic abuse offenders and those subject to TPIMs.
8. A copy of the explanation (written or oral) of the polygraph test, pre-test and post-test interview as received by the examinee (please note that sensitive information relating to particular questions are not requested, rather the template explanation provided).
9. A copy of the explanation (written or oral) of the polygraph test, pre-test and post-test interview as received by the examinee's legal representative (please note that sensitive information relating to particular questions are not requested, rather the template explanation provided).
10. The cost to the Force since 1 Jan 2021 of the purchase and maintenance of Lafayette polygraph testing equipment (and/or other commercial devices deployed) including the ongoing cost of software licences.
11. A copy of the procurement contract(s) for the purchase of the above-mentioned equipment/software.
12. A copy of the instruction manual relating to the Lafayette polygraph testing equipment, including the integrated software (and/or other commercial devices deployed) as used by polygraph examiners.

CRU Advice

Q1, and 2, It is our understanding that forces don't routinely use Polygraph tests for investigative purposes. However, that's not say that they haven't. Regardless, as the applicant has been broad in that the questions relate to suspects for any offence, practitioners will need to include a partial NCND s23(5) s24(2), s30(3), s31(3) in respect of CT investigations more generally.

In short, forces that do not conduct Polygraph testing can state No Information held in respect of sex offenders and DA offenders, and add the partial NCND that no other information is held relative to terrorism.

Forces that do conduct Polygraph testing Subject to local assessment, there is no immediate harm in providing statistical data requested, along with the partial NCND mentioned to mask any CT investigations.

Q3 As this is specific in relation to individuals who pose a risk of children, an overall total can be given, if at all held.

Q4 If such a document is held, local assessment will be required to ensure no information of a tactical nature

is included (as per s31), in addition to any s40(2) Personal Information concerns.

Q5 and 6 It is expected that forces will not hold any information relevant to these two questions. However, if held, it will be subject to local assessment. Please refer back to the CRU with any concerns.

Q7 The question being asked is in relation to persons other than the list provided. We suspect this is No Information Held across the board.

Q8 and 9 These questions concern the pre-test and post-test phases. The pre-test is particularly sensitive as it is the engagement phase when the questions are outlined to the subject and the process explained. This is when the police receive the most disclosures as the subject realises they are going to struggle to answer the questions truthfully and discloses beforehand.

As such, each force will need to locally assess the information they hold relevant to these two requests about pre-test and post-test explanations in accordance with s31(1) Law Enforcement considerations.

If further assistance is required, please refer back to the CRU accordingly.

Q10 There is no harm providing the total amount of expenditure since 2021.

Q11 and 12 To provide a copy of the contract with the supplier, and a manual relevant to the design, layout and function of the software engages s43(2) Commercial Interest considerations.

Practitioners will need to check beforehand, but the likelihood is that the instruction manual over the operation of the hardware (the Polygraph testing equipment) is commercially available within the public domain. If not, then s43(2) consideration should be given to the matter, albeit that it may prove fit for release.

To explain that further, whether it is the manual for the equipment or software, in order to rely on s43, a public authority must show genuine commercial prejudice from the disclosure, and so we would always advise that your force Legal Dept is consulted throughout the process. Example considerations would include:

s43(2) protects information which would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person, and it could be argued that disclosure of contract details would weaken your forces position in a competitive environment by revealing sensitive information or information that is potentially useful in a negotiating position.

Preserving relationships of trust and confidence and the free flow of information between the force and suppliers is paramount. The disclosure of the requested information may jeopardise such a relationship, which is fundamentally important in maintaining the most effective delivery of public services.

There is a strong public interest in the force using public resources efficiently and this outcome would not be served by the disclosure of the information.

In addition, there is also a requirement to contact the third party to seek their views, which is echoed by the ICO. If you propose to withhold information because the disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice a third party's commercial interests, you must have evidence that this accurately reflects the third party's concerns. It is not sufficient to simply speculate about the prejudice which might be caused to the third party's commercial interests. The third party will need to be consulted for their exact views in all but the most exceptional circumstances.

Form of words to assist

Force Name can neither confirm nor deny whether it holds any other information that you requested as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters

Section 24(2) National Security

Section 30(3) Criminal Investigations

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

HARM

The FOI Act is applicant blind . This means that we cannot, and do not, ask about the motives of anyone who asks for information. In providing a response to one person, we are expressing a willingness to provide the same response to anyone, including those who might represent a threat to the UK.

It is public knowledge that not all Police forces conduct Polygraph Testing of post-conviction sex offenders, and this extends to the testing of Domestic Abuse (DA) offenders. It is also public knowledge that the 2014 National Policing stance sets out the evidential implications of using Polygraph within the investigation setting:

<https://library.college.police.uk/docs/APPREF/National-Policing-Position-Statement-use-of-Polygraph-May-2014.pdf>

However, modern day policing is intelligence led and this is particularly pertinent with regard to law enforcement, and Counter Terrorism. The public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. As such, confirmation or denial is only possible when doing so would not reveal certain tactics and techniques, the extent to which they may be deployed, and whether information is held that has a bearing on matters of National Security.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level based upon current intelligence, and that threat is currently judged as SUBSTANTIAL , meaning that an attack on the UK is likely.

It is well established that police forces use tactics and technology to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour, and it has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.

To confirm or deny that any other information is held in relation to Polygraph testing in circumstances or scenarios beyond sex offender, or DA offender management at force level, would reveal whether the technique has utility beyond post-conviction sex offender, or DA offender testing within the wider Law Enforcement sphere. Notably, to confirm or deny whether any other information is held relevant to Polygraph testing in a Counter Terrorism setting, whether that is a post-conviction terrorist offender, or someone suspected of being so connected with such activities, would reveal whether such techniques are in use as an investigative, and more so, intelligence gathering tactic.

Confirmation or denial across the Police Service would infer that there are gaps within the intelligence picture nationally which, for certain criminal elements and extremists, may embolden them to focus efforts within areas

that they deem to be soft targets. Any incident that results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.

Public Interest Test

Some of the exemptions in the FOI Act, referred to as qualified exemptions, are subject to a public interest test (PIT). This test is used to balance the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in favour of withholding the information, or the considerations for and against the requirement to say whether the information requested is held or not. We must carry out a PIT where we are considering using any of the qualified exemptions in response to a request for information.

The public interest is not the same as what interests the public. In carrying out a PIT we consider the greater good or benefit to the community as a whole if the information is released or not. The right to know must be balanced against the need to enable effective law enforcement and to serve the best interests of the public.

S24(2) - Considerations in favour of confirming or denying the information is held

The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and confirm or deny the requested information is held would allow the public to see where money is being spent and know that forces are doing as much as possible to combat terrorism.

S24(2) - Considerations in favour of neither confirming or denying the information is held

To confirm or deny information is held would render security measures less effective. Any information shared between law enforcement partners (i.e. intelligence) has the potential to cover all aspects of criminal activity, be it threats to life, or intelligence relating to terrorist activity. Confirmation or denial could highlight to those intent on criminality, whether or not information has been shared. Confirming such would dramatically weaken the effectiveness of intelligence led policing. The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with any information, no matter how generic that is.

S30(3) - Considerations in favour of confirming or denying the information is held

There is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that Force Name is appropriately and effectively dealing with Counter Terrorism. Confirming or denying whether any other information is held would allow the public to make informed decisions about these matters.

S30(3) - Considerations in favour of neither confirming or denying the information is held

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that Force

Name is appropriately and effectively dealing with the threat of Terrorism, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations and in maintaining confidence in the Police Service. Any ongoing or future investigations, or operations to protect the security and infrastructure of the UK would be compromised as terrorists could map the level of Counter-Terrorist activity and intelligence sharing across the country, providing them with the knowledge of individual force capability as well as valuable knowledge concerning the vulnerability of individual force areas.

S31(3) - Considerations in favour of confirming or denying the information is held

FORCE NAME has a responsibility to conduct its business in an open and transparent manner. Confirmation or denial of all circumstances related to the use of Polygraph testing would assure the public that the police is committed to combating crime and terrorism. It would also ensure the public that the activities of certain individuals are being monitored by law enforcement so that individuals are aware of the investigative techniques used in order to protect the public, thus leading to better public awareness.

S31(3) - Considerations in favour of neither confirming or denying the information is held

Disclosure of the information, if held, would mean releasing sensitive information into the public domain, which could compromise law enforcement tactics, which could in turn hinder the prevention and detection of crime. To disclose whether information is held in relation to Polygraph Testing, whether by the force itself, or through the provision of information from other Law Enforcement partners in relation to Counter Terrorism would:

a) allow criminals and extremists to evade prosecution or detection if they believe such practices are not in use for the purpose of seeking intelligence, or;

b) cause criminals and extremists to alter their behaviour if they become aware of the tactics and techniques the police might employ, and to what extent.

Therefore confirming or denying whether any other information is held could compromise the prevention and detection of crime, which includes Terrorism.

Balancing Test

As evidenced within the harm above, confirming or denying any other information is held relevant to this request would start to indicate levels of specific policing activity at force level, and more broadly from a national perspective in relation to Counter Terrorism matters.

The Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine Law Enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations, and in this case providing assurance that FORCE NAME is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat

posed by criminal and terrorist activity (either at force level or through the provision of assistance to, or from partners) there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding law enforcement, which by extension includes National Security.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced about such matters, this will only ever be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Matters in relation to crime and terrorism are sensitive issues of intelligence value to those who would do harm, and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation to Polygraph tests and Counter Terrorism would not be in the public interest.

Kind regards,



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)

National Police Chiefs' Council



W | www.npcc.police.uk

From: [REDACTED]
Subject: OS - CRU 25/5123 - Plascan Sandcat
Date: 09 September 2025 09:25:46
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

You don't often get email from [REDACTED] - [Learn why this is important](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

Apologies for delays. Please see below advice in relation to the following:

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005123/X

Referred by: National

Applicant's request

Please provide information held by your force regarding the procurement and use of Plasan Sandcat Tigris armoured vehicles (including any variant referred to as "Sandcat").

1. Procurement activity (October 2023 – present)

- a) The number of Sandcat Tigris (or Sandcat variant) vehicles ordered.*
- b) The number of such vehicles delivered and currently held by the force.*
- c) Please confirm explicitly if no such vehicles have been ordered, delivered, or are planned for purchase.*

2. Operational status

- a) Of any vehicles acquired, how many are available for deployment?*
- b) How many are not available for deployment (for example, undergoing modifications, repair, or awaiting approval)?*

If you consider releasing this information to be exempt under Section 31 (Law Enforcement) or any other FOIA exemption, please still release all other requested information and provide your reasoning and the outcome of the public interest test.

3. Financial expenditure

- a) The total cost (including VAT and any associated modifications, fittings, or logistics) for all Sandcat Tigris (or Sandcat variant) vehicles purchased in the above period.*
- b) If vehicles were ordered but payment is not yet complete, please confirm the current status of payments.*

4. Supplier/ procurement route

- a) For each purchase, please confirm whether it was made directly from Plasan Sasa Ltd or via the UK distributor Ricardo UK Ltd.*
- b) If supplier details are considered exempt under Section 43 (commercial interests) or Section 31 (law enforcement), please still release all other requested information and explain the exemption applied, including the public interest test outcome.*

CRU Advice

The following is provided in line with the views of the NPCC Armed Policing Portfolio.

In brief:

- **We are aware that the MPS and Police Scotland have avowed purchasing the Plascan Sandcat variant.**
- **We are aware that a number of other forces have already, or are considering, purchasing Sandcat's. But at this time, we aren't aware of wide spread force publication about such information.**
- **We know not all forces will hold information for this request. However;**
- **We are advising that all forces other than the MPS/Police Scotland respond NCND s24(2) and s31(3).**

The Sandcat and the Lenco Bearcat are the two main law enforcement specialist/ballistically protected vehicles available on the market and so any UK force looking to procure such a vehicle will almost certainly go with one of these 2 x manufacturers. But as practitioners know, when it comes to Armed Policing the national stance is to avoid revealing precisely what assets are held (or any lack thereof) and where they are located. This stance is applicable to the number and types of vehicles used for force level Armed Response, the location of CTSFO hubs, the numbers of CTSFOs, etc. Basically, practitioners need to be alert to FOI requests that would result in disclosing information at a tactical level about force capabilities, and more so the national level about Armed Policing, including Counter Terrorism.

So, whilst this request concerns very conspicuous vehicles that would clearly attract attention if seen on the public streets, there is a need to protect against placing all of the information in one place by the mechanism of FOI exactly as to which forces do or do not have them. If each force were to confirm or deny holding information relevant to this request it would not only create a map that would infer gaps and vulnerabilities from the AP vehicle perspective, but it would be a window into the wider picture about who is likely housing specialist AP roles.

A form of words to assist with the NCND s24(2) and s31(3)

Harm in complying with Section 1(1)(a) – to confirm or not whether information is held

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. In order to achieve these objectives we are allowed to use reasonable force where necessary to do so. In the ultimate circumstance this can include the use of lethal force but the rule of thumb is to use the minimum amount necessary to achieve the objective. In reality this equates to the use of the minimum amount of force required to overcome the violence, used or threatened, by those wishing to cause harm.

As part of this equation we also have to pay heed to the Human Rights Convention particularly Article 2 – The Right to life. The law and regulations relating to the use of force are detailed within the [Authorised Professional Practice \(APP\) document for Armed Policing](#).

Armed Policing is a highly specialised area of firearms deployment and weapons training. It is an emotive subject under constant scrutiny and, by default, is always in the public eye. There is a long history of excellent practice nationally and Armed Policing is regarded as being at the forefront of firearms issues.

Any release under FOIA is a disclosure to the world, not just to the individual making the request. To confirm or not that information is held in relation to this request would reveal whether or not FORCE NAME has Plascan Sandcat armoured vehicles. Such awareness would reveal tactical capability and is likely to influence the criminals, which may include terrorists or terrorist organisations, who are prepared to resort to the use of extreme force in order to avoid detection and capture. By fully knowing whether or not these vehicles are used by FORCE NAME will enable offenders to ensure they are armed in a way as to overcome the police response. This creates if you will an 'arms race' to the detriment of the criminals themselves, as the use of

lethal weapons becomes more and more the only resolution option, and endangers both the public and officers themselves. This is best evidenced by the fact that the United Kingdom, even in these violent times, has been able to maintain a basically unarmed Police Service, with the resulting benefits this delivers when compared with other countries, such as America, where armed conflict resolution with law enforcement agencies depends on who has the most effective weapons.

Furthermore, the threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The current UK threat level from international terrorism, based on intelligence, is assessed as [Substantial](#), which means that a terrorist attack is likely.

In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour it is vital that the police have the ability to adopt techniques and procedures commensurate with the perceived threat, and deploy accordingly. The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built and the police have a clear responsibility to prevent crime, arrest those responsible for committing crime or those that plan to commit crime. However, there is also a duty of care to the public at large. The UK Police Service has a positive undertaking to protect the public from harm and that duty of care to all involved must be the overriding consideration.

The protection of the public is of paramount importance and FORCE NAME will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so could compromise Law Enforcement.

Public Interest Considerations

Section 24(2) National Security

Factors for disclosure

The public are entitled to know why decisions are made and how resources are distributed within an area of policing. Confirmation would inform the public that the police provide an appropriate level of tactical armed response when required. This would provide transparency with regard to the use of public funds inasmuch as the funds are being used correctly and appropriately ensuring the Armed Policing Departments within individual forces are equipped adequately.

Factors against disclosure

Whilst there is a public interest in providing reassurance that the police are appropriately and effectively dealing with threats posed by terrorist organisations, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding national security and the welfare and safety of the general public.

Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force's ability to monitor terrorist activity. The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection, as well as the safety of their officers and staff. The only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain. Confirmation or denial has the potential to undermine ongoing and future operations to protect the Security of the United Kingdom, e.g. counter terrorism activity. The risk of significant harm or even death to the community at large would be increased.

Any incident that results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.

Section 31

Factors for disclosure

There is a public interest in being made aware of all the facts relating to Armed Policing in order to ensure complete openness and transparency as there is often speculation and rumour with regard to the use of firearms within the Police Service. In this case revealing whether or not specific armoured vehicles are in service force-by-force would provide transparency and may

enhance public debate into this area of policing.

Factors against disclosure

The deployment of authorised firearms officers is measured and authorised by chief officers after careful consideration in order to protect the public and apprehend individuals who use lethal weapons as part of their criminality. To confirm or deny information is held would reveal tactical capability, or lack thereof, which places the police at a tactical disadvantage. In addition, confirmation or denial may also 'create' a fear of crime within the general public relating to armed policing.

FORCE NAME has a duty of care to the community at large and public safety is of paramount importance. If an FOI disclosure revealed information to the world (by citing an exemption or stating no information held) that would undermine the security of the National Infrastructure, offenders, including terrorist organisations, could use this to their advantage which would compromise public safety and more worryingly encourage offenders to carry out further crimes. The risk to public safety cannot be ignored and FORCE NAME has a responsibility to ensure safety of individuals is protected at all times, as detailed within the harm.

Balancing Test

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing resources for specialist departments and providing reassurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively placing resources into Armed Policing, there is a strong public interest in knowing that policing activity with regard to the delivery of law enforcement is appropriate and balanced, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

In addition, we also need to take into account the victims of terrorism. Public safety is of paramount importance and any information which would place individuals at risk and compromise the National Security of the United Kingdom, no matter how generic, is not in the public interest. The effective delivery of operational law enforcement and the National Security of the UK is crucial and of a fundamental duty to FORCE NAME. Any disclosure would have a negative impact on law enforcement and national security.

As much as there is a public interest in knowing that the delivery of law enforcement is appropriate and balanced, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test outweighs the need to confirm information is held and falls in favour of issuing a neither confirm nor deny refusal.

No inference can be taken from this refusal that information does or does not exist.

[END]


Kind regards,

[Redacted Signature]

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council
NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

[Redacted Address Line]

[Redacted Address Line]



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for

the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

[REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5142/A - DPIA's - Including Advice
Date: 12 September 2025 08:32:54
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5142/A

Referred by: All forces

Applicant's request:

- A complete list of Data Protection Impact Assessments produced by your force in the past five years.

CRU Advice:

The applicant is asking for a list of DPIA's produced in the last 5 years by your force. We are interpreting the request as only asking for a list of titles and not for full copies of the DPIA's in question. It may be the case that you do not hold an actual list already in a recorded form. However, in such a case we would expect the ICO to support a force compiling the information they held into a list format for disclosure. In other words, even if you don't hold an actual list as specifically recorded information, compiling a list to answer this FOI would not, in our view, be considered creating information thus we would not expect this scenario to result in a force issuing a NIH response.

As with any request, cost should be the first consideration. If to locate and retrieve all the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act, s12 should be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so.

We are aware that s14 is being considered in at least one instance. Any application of s14 is ultimately for the force to decide upon, but as it is only a list of titles and not full copies of the DPIA's, then our initial thoughts are that s14(1) vexatious – overly burdensome, may stand up less well to scrutiny than if, say, full DPIA's were being requested. As stated though, it depends on individual force circumstances and what is held, so is for practitioners to make final determinations. [ICO guidance on single burdensome requests](#) may assist any force considering such an approach.

Where neither s12 nor s14 are being considered, then what is suitable for disclosure will depend on exactly what you hold. We recommend that forces review all DPIA's captured and, in consultation with your force experts, determine which once are suitable for release and which will present harm.

For DPIA's local to your force, it is highly probable that at least some will be identified as harmful, particularly those that reveal information about tools/tactics for CT, SOC, covert policing or other sensitive tactics or operations; please refer to the relevant internal teams for guidance on this – they are best placed to advise you based on the specifics of what the DPIA applies to. From a national perspective, very generic titles such as those which state tactics already known to be used by police such as polygraph testing, CHIS, etc can be given. At the other end of the scale, details of individual products which would otherwise attract an NCND if asked about under FOI such as Cellebrite or Longarm must be removed from your disclosure.

To help support you with making the above determinations, in addition to your consultation with

the relevant teams, we ask that you refer to previous CRU guidance, especially on specific products/technologies, as this will guide you on current topics/products nationally considered suitable/not suitable for release. If, after completing thorough local assessment and a full review of all past CRU advice you are still unable to determine whether a DPIA naming a specific product is suitable for release, then you can recontact us with the name of that product and we will aim to assist further via consultation with policing leads. However, please may we ask that you exhaust ALL avenues to determine harm in-force first? Whilst we can consult with leads on a limited basis, i.e. for products which simply cannot be deduced, we cannot consult on entire lists of unchecked multiple products from every force. We are only able to assist on the very few software products which you cannot apply previous advice and/or internal views to, to determine harm – so we ask that you do not send full lists of products for guidance.

There may also be national DPIA's held. In respect of these we recommend that in the first instance, each one is checked to see if information about it is in the public domain or not. For example, we understand some forces hold DPIA's for Op Innerste – this is in the PD and thus I'd see no reason to consult with the NPCC or Home Office, so we don't need to know about those DPIA's.

However, others may relate to subject matter which is not already publicly avowed and as such these will need to be consulted on with the relevant national body. For any of these identified as part of your checks, i.e. you identify any subject matter of a DPIA which is not referenced publicly already, then please can you send us a list of those titles alongside the national body (NPCC/Home Office/College) that they relate to and we will liaise with them to ensure they are content for you to release the titles as part of this FOI.

Once you have identified all the DPIA's that are harmful to release, anything considered harmful should be entirely removed from disclosure (**not** redacted from an overall list) and protected under a partial NCND s24(2) and s31(3). Even if you identify nothing which is harmful, the partial NCND must still be included to ensure consistency from a national perspective.

The reason for a partial NCND (as opposed to substantive exemptions) is to mitigate the risk of cross referencing with other similar requests over time (creating a mosaic effect of what may or may not be in scope for forces at any given time) as well as ensuring that no future request in which specified a particular tool/tactic/DPIA for which an NCND is required due to sensitivities, is undermined.

We were made aware of a similar request last year; the form of words created and used by that force is provided below as a starting point for your harm and PIT arguments. Obviously, this is only a guide and will need to be made force and case specific.

Once you have drafted your final response, please can you forward us a copy prior to release, alongside any information you propose to release? To note, we do not need to see any s12 or s14 responses.

Form of words:

XXX Police neither confirms nor denies that it holds any other information relevant to this request by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(2) - National Security

Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement

Sections 24 and 31 are prejudice based qualified exemptions, both evidence of harm and public interest to be carried out.

Evidence of Harm:

Confirmation or denial that any other information is held would identify local level activity regarding data, it's management and any relevant assessments that protect this data. In turn this risks identifying the areas that XXX Police may or may not be applying Data Protection Impact

Assessments. This would reveal information which could be used to build a picture as to where national and local investigations and operations, along with their processes and systems, are being undertaken, and perhaps more pertinently where they are not. This mapping effect, created by forces either confirming information is held and citing a substantive exemption or, conversely, stating 'no information held', would undermine the effective delivery of operational law enforcement by revealing the intelligence picture of the force in respect of Data Protection and how it is managed as well as compromising potentially ongoing investigations, some of which may be covert.

Disclosure of information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) is considered a release to the world at large and not a private transaction. Whilst not questioning an applicant's motives in this case, by making a public disclosure under FOI, it must be considered that as well as members of the public, criminals, including terrorists will be able to access the data released. It is widely known that organised criminal gangs and those involved in terrorist related activity monitor FOI disclosures closely for any information they can use to further their criminal activity. The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, based upon current intelligence that threat level to the UK currently is 'substantial, meaning an attack is likely.

<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels>

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity and how they protect and manage data could be used to the advantage of criminal organisations, serious and organised crime groups and terrorists to undermine the operational integrity of policing will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on, not only law enforcement at a local level, but policing and operations at a national level, the impact of which risks the national security of the UK.

Public Interest Considerations

Section 24 (2) National Security

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a)

Any information that would increase public knowledge in showing how resources are allocated in response to events would favour confirming whether anything else was held or not. This would also support the fundamental purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, which is to be more open and transparent in the way in which the police perform, making them more accountable for their actions. Releasing any details regarding **XXX Police's** current Data Protection Impact Assessments would provide reassurance to the public that the police are appropriately resourced in this area and would be in a position to respond to any National Security threats or data breach incidents, along with protecting data of every individual with their force area. Any information which would allow for more accurate public debate would be a positive factor for disclosure.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)

Whilst there is a public interest in providing reassurance that the police are appropriately and effectively dealing with threats posed by terrorist organisations, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding national security and the welfare and safety of the general public, including all forms of personal data. Any disclosure (including confirming or denying information is held) has the potential to undermine ongoing and future operations to protect the Security of the United Kingdom, e.g. counter terrorism activity, both nationally and locally. The risk of significant harm or even death to the community at large would be increased.

The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would build a picture of potential vulnerabilities at a local level. The more information disclosed over time will

provide a more detailed account of the investigative focus of not only a force area but also the country as a whole. Any incident which results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a)

To confirm or deny that any other information is held would make members of the public more aware of the threats and the forces ability to deal with them. Improved public awareness may lead to more intelligence being submitted to police about possible further instances regarding personal data and any acts of criminality or perceived terrorism as members of the public will be more observant to suspicious activity which in turn may result in a reduction of crime.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)

To confirm or deny that any other information is held could compromise law enforcement tactics which would hinder the Police force's ability to prevent and detect crimes. Whilst such information on its own may be perceived as not harmful, any further information that may be already in the public domain or any that may be asked for in the future could be detrimental to forces and can contribute to the mosaic effect. The 'mosaic' effect is attune to the building up of a jigsaw, from public disclosures and other information, gradually filling in the pieces to form a complete picture. For criminals, including serious and organised crime groups and terrorists to gain easy access to such information, including data for intelligence purposes, along with everyone's personal data would not only undermine the police's primary function of law enforcement but also place the public at significant risk of harm.

Balancing Test

XXX Police is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security and maintenance of investigations are of paramount importance and the XXX Police will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations. It is therefore our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or not that information is held, is not made out.

Kind regards

[Redacted Signature]


[Redacted Name]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

📬 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

[Redacted Address Line]

[Redacted Address Line]



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

[REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5220/X - Costs and arrests at PA protests - Including Advice
Date: 15 September 2025 09:31:37
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior
authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU on . Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5220/X

Referred by: Bedfordshire Police

Applicant's request:

1. Since July 5th 2025 until the date that this request is received, how much has been spent on policing protests directly linked to Palestine Action?

2. Since July 5th 2025 until the date that this request is received, how many cumulative days have people arrested for supporting Palestine Action (under Terrorism Act 2000) spent in custody suites?

3. Since July 5th 2025 until the date that this request is received, how many people arrested for supporting Palestine Action (under Terrorism Act 2000) have been:

- Released without bail
- Released with bail
- Charged
- Remanded in custody


CRU Advice:

As with any request the first consideration should be cost. If to locate and retrieve all the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act, s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine the request, if feasible to do so. If cost is not relevant, the following advice is provided:

Q1 – If you have assigned a specific cost code to policing of PA protests, then you may be able to locate and retrieve relevant information for this question. Where so, we see no immediate harm in forces confirming a total figure. If no specific figure is held, for example policing the protests was within normal operational duties i.e. no direct, separate costs, then we'd see no harm in stating NIH with that explanation if you believe it is required for clarity.

Q2 & Q3 – Subject to your local assessment for any s40(2), and possibly s31(1) sensitivities if ongoing investigations could be undermined through disclosure, then figures can be considered for release.

Kind regards




National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to



and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5170/E - External traditional forensics - Including Advice
Date: 15 September 2025 14:41:35
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5170/E

Referred by: All forces

Applicant's request:

Please provide the total amount in £ (excluding VAT) that your force has spent on external physical (traditional) forensic science services. Do not include any spend on digital forensics. I request that this is broken down into categories based on the Lot Code and description specified in the contract(s) awarded to your private forensic science provider suppliers.

For each category, please include:

1. The Lot Code (as per the contract)
2. The Lot description (e.g., DNA Crime Stains)
3. The total spend (£, ex VAT)
4. The supplier name

For example:

Lot X | DNA Crime Stains | £1,000,000 | Eurofins Forensic Services

Lot Y | Toxicology | £500,000 | Cellmark Forensic Services

CRU Advice:

As with any request, cost should be the first consideration. If to locate and retrieve all the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act, then s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so. If cost is not a factor, then the following advice applies:


Firstly, as the request asks only for “traditional” forensics only and no digital forensic providers (which are exempt), we see no immediate risk from a law enforcement perspective in providing supplier names.

In terms of providing the lot number and description, then we can again see no immediate risks provided the detail you propose to release does not disclose any otherwise non-avowed or sensitive forensic techniques which are undertaken. Based on the few forces who have provided us with the information they hold, I have not yet seen anything of such a nature which would require redaction under s31(1)(a)(b), however we'd still advise you to check this before issuing your response.

With no obvious s31 considerations, the only other area of concern are any procurement sensitivities falling under s43, 'commercial interests', Ultimately, it will be for contracts team to identify any specific harm associated with disclosure, for example if a disclosure

would reveal low level commercially sensitive data such as unit prices, or other low level or unique information that could be deemed commercially sensitive to the supplier then s43 would be engaged and could apply depending on the strength of your public interest arguments. Equally, if there is any risk to the commercial interests of the public authority (say, a contract is currently up for tender and revealing information which constitutes low level costings would harm that, then again, s43 could be considered. However, as you are likely aware, there is high threshold required to balance the public interest in favour of non-disclosure for s43– ICO guidance can be found [here](#) to assist you with that further if required. On that basis, and in our view, unless your procurement/contracts team identify anything specific to your force, the spends can be provided.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

📧 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to



and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Centurion / FIS FOI - FDU Ref: FOI 2025-896
Date: 17 September 2025 14:31:40
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)
[image003.png](#)

Hi [REDACTED]

My apologies – BAR stands for Business Area Request!

The surname is [REDACTED]

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
FDU Decision Maker [REDACTED]

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police HQ London Rd, Devizes SN10 2DN

Email [REDACTED]

Phone [REDACTED]



WILTSHIRE POLICE

Keeping Wiltshire Safe

| [facebook/wiltshirepolice](https://facebook.com/wiltshirepolice) | [x/wiltshirepolice](https://x.com/wiltshirepolice) | [LinkedIn/company/wiltshirepolice](https://linkedin.com/company/wiltshirepolice)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 17 September 2025 14:30
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Centurion / FIS FOI - FDU Ref: FOI 2025-896

Hi A [REDACTED]

Can I just check the surname is Bar please?

It would help the other forces when searching their systems for the request.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council
 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 17 September 2025 11:32
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Centurion / FIS FOI - FDU Ref: FOI 2025-896

Good morning,

I have been allocated the attached FOI relating to misconduct hearings.

Please can you let me know if this is a national request? I have emailed our PSD department to let them know this has been queried, so they know to look out for this if it is.

I look forward to hearing from you.

All members of the Force Disclosure Unit are working from home and are each going into the office on an ad-hoc basis. As a result, there may be a delay in responding to any postal requests and therefore we would like to apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Kind regards,

[Redacted]
FDU Decision Maker [Redacted]

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police HQ London Rd, Devizes SN10 2DN

Email [Redacted]
Phone [Redacted]



WILTSHIRE POLICE
Keeping Wiltshire Safe
facebook/wiltshirepolice x/wiltshirepolice LinkedIn/company/wiltshirepolice

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [Redacted] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005266/L - Data Extraction Kiosks - National Advice Included
Date: 09 October 2025 15:58:19

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005266/L

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

I am writing to ask that you provide me with the following information on your use of mobile phone data extraction:

1. Does your police force currently carry out mobile phone data extraction in low level crime cases using self-service / downloading kiosks? Please provide your definition of low-level crime.
2. Does your police force currently carry out mobile phone data extraction in serious crimes using self-service / downloading kiosks?
3. If your police force is not currently using mobile phone extraction kiosks, have you trialled this in the past/do you have plans to in the future?
4. Does your police force currently use Hubs to carry out mobile phone data extraction in (a) low-level crimes? (b) serious crimes?
5. Do you centrally record mobile phone data extracted from kiosks?
6. If you have a mobile phone extraction kiosk, please provide the name of the company(ies) which currently provide(s) the hardware / software / to whom you pay a license for the relevant tools. If contracts for these tools exist, please also provide the beginning and end dates of these.
7. Does your police force use analytics software to process, analyse or evaluate data extracted from mobile phones? If so, please provide the name of the software or provider.
8. How many officers currently carry mobile phone examination kits on patrol and/or in vehicles and/or for other operational use in (a) low level crimes? (b) serious crimes?
9. Please confirm whether or not a review has been conducted into the use of self-service kiosks.
10. Please provide copies of the current relevant force level and/or national level guidance for the use of downloading kiosks.
11. Please provide copies of the current relevant force level and/or national level policy for the use of downloading kiosks.

CRU Advice:

Thank you for your patience with this request.

Advice is provided on the assumption that all the requested information can be located and retrieved within the cost threshold. Where this is not relevant, s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend that you advise the applicant how best to refine their request to fit within the cost threshold, if feasible to do so.

Downloading Kiosks are used for extracting data 'digital forensics' from mobile phones and other digital devices. They are secure and officer operated and allow download data, such as calls, messages and social media activity for investigations.

Q1 – Disclosure can be considered as a yes/no response. Many forces the use of the kiosk is not according to a crime type and is in relation to be able to access the phones data. Should your force not hold this information then a NIH held response can be given.

Q2 – This will be the same as Q1

Q3 – For this question as they are not asking about 'which' software might be used we see no harm in confirming if your force has trialled or plan to trial the extraction Kiosks, which is a yes/no response.

Q4 – Forces can confirm yes or no to this question. Equally should your force not hold the information then a NIH response can be given

Q5 – Again, forces can confirm yes or no to this question. Equally should your force not hold the information then a NIH response can be given

Q6 – For the first part of this question forces can confirm that they use a Kiosk, however for the name of the company(ies) these will need to be considered for exemption by the virtue of S31(1) (a)(b) - Law Enforcement

Q7 – As the applicant is asking about which specific software is being used on the second part of this question, the information should be withheld. We would advise to consider for exemption s24 National Security and S31 Law enforcement. The rationale for using s24 here is that by disclosing the software name it opens up to cyber attacks and impacts force capabilities, of which both will impact national security.

Q8 – This information is likely to not be held or the number zero due to police officers not carrying the phone examination kits while on patrol, and if this is the case we are content for your reply to be as such. Should your force however have officers who carry these kits please let us know and we can advise further for you.

Q9 – If your force uses the kiosks then it is highly likely you have regular reviews on the kiosks and those trained to use them, therefore we are content for you to confirm yes or no to this. Again, should your force not hold the information then a NIH response can be given.

Q10 & Q11 - The college of policing have information on this and the applicant can be directed to the website - [Extraction of material from digital devices | College of Policing](#)

If you are content to include s24 and s31 then CRU will not need to see your drafts.

I have included below a form of words to help.

HARM

Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, disclosure of a particular policing tool of this type is used by **FORCE NAME** as part of an investigative process would reveal operational tactics linked to policing, compromise police investigations and/or adversely affect the ability of **FORCE NAME** and others to safeguard national security.

It is well established that police forces utilise Digital Forensic techniques in order to counteract criminal behaviour, detect crime, and assist in the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. Modern day policing is intelligence led and law enforcement depends upon the development of intelligence and the gathering and security of evidence in order to disrupt criminal behaviour and bring offenders to justice. As criminals adapt and exploit new technology, the police need to respond by overcoming hi-tech barriers in order to meet their responsibilities. In this case the information relates to a service provider and by extension their products for the extraction of data from devices to their Kiosks.

By disclosing if **FORCE NAME** use named software to process, analyse or evaluate data extracted from mobile phones such as requested within this request, it would undermine the process of preventing or detecting crime and the apprehension of prosecution of offenders. When considered on a Force by Force basis, a malign individual could identify those most critical to the Law-and-Order sector and specifically target those proving the most assistance. This would have a huge impact on the effective delivery of operational law enforcement as it would leave companies open to further cyberattacks which could have devastating consequences for law enforcement.

Equally, given the sensitive areas in which tools of this type may be used, such as counter-terror investigations, to disclose if any particular tools are used would allow criminals and other adversaries to focus on evaluating the particular capabilities of its use. With this knowledge it would allow criminals and other adversaries to take steps to counteract a specific tool – be it adjusting how they interact and present themselves to take advantage of any weaknesses or gaps in capability they identify. For example, at a simple level, if a policing tool doesn't search 'X' 'social media site or was unable to identify 'Y' format of images and criminals can establish this, they will exploit this position. **FORCE NAMES** more sophisticated adversaries may be able to go further and take more proactive measures to undermine the tool and/or its provider, and a specific confirmation allows efforts to be focused accordingly.

This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies such as this request has. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to 'map' where the use of certain tools are or are not used. This can be useful information to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of

terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.

PUBLIC INTEREST TEST

Factors favouring disclosure for section 24 National Security:

Disclosing would provide the public with information about technologies and **FORCE NAME** capabilities. This would reinforce the wider commitment to openness and transparency with the general public and facilitate public debate. Furthermore, owing to the inherent link between transparency and public confidence, Disclosing the software name and how it works would be likely to improve the general public's confidence in **FORCE NAME**. Over time, an increase in public confidence would be likely to improve public engagement with the police. This would, in turn, lead to an improvement in our ability to both prevent and detect crime, and apprehend and prosecute offenders.

Factors favouring non-disclosure for section 24 National Security:

Security measures are put in place to protect the community that we serve. To disclose the software name and its uses would be useful intelligence to terrorists and individuals intent on carrying out criminal activity. The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.

The cumulative effect of those with ill-intent gathering information about force capabilities, would have greater impact when linked to other information gathered from various sources. The more information that is disclosed over time will provide a detailed account of the tactical infrastructure, not only at force level but across the country as a whole. Any incident that results from confirming that any information is held would by default affect National Security.

Factors favouring disclosure for section 31 Law Enforcement:

The public have a genuine interest in what the police do and how they do it. Their interest is legitimate and to be encouraged within a democratic society where policing is by consent.

Public accountability for the use of resources and taxpayers' money, and a willingness to be transparent and open are desirable characteristics in all public authorities.

The interest on which software packages are being used and how is therefore to be expected, especially when there is some concern as to whether such expenditure is appropriate and justified.

Factors favouring non- disclosure for section 31 Law Enforcement:

To disclose the particular software used and how it is used by policing would compromise the forces' ability to protect the public. Disclosing **FORCE NAME** capabilities would provide persons intent on disrupting their work, with information that would assist them to do so. In this case, for the reasons outlined in the evidenced harm, the effectiveness of current and future strategies when carrying out investigations and gathering evidence may be compromised. The safety of the public is of paramount importance to policing purposes, and any increase in crime would place

the public at risk of harm. When the current or future law enforcement role of the force may be compromised by the release of information, the effectiveness of the force will be reduced.

The personal safety of individuals is of paramount importance to the Police Service and must be considered in response of every release. A disclosure under Freedom of Information is a release to the world and, in this case, disclosing tactical information relating to the extraction of data from mobile devices, would undermine the evidence gathering process of any investigative inquiry relating to offences, some of which may be serious cases such as murder or rape.

Balance Test

The points above highlight the merits of disclosure and also non -disclosure. Having considered the reasons why **FORCE NAME** should opt to not disclose the software name and its uses, although openness and transparency is at the forefront when considering the public interest, in this case disclosing the software used and how it is analysed, evaluated and used by the police for investigative purposes would not be in the public interest.

Whilst there is a public interest in appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding National Security. As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with any information that is released. Disclosing the software would reveal specific policing activity in the digital sphere of investigations and would assist those intent on causing harm. Any incident that results from disclosure would, as a result, affect National Security.

I have found that disclosing the software used would directly harm the ability of **FORCE NAME** to investigate crime. This could also reveal police capabilities, compromise police investigations and/or otherwise, adversely affect the ability of **FORCE NAME** to safeguard national security. I have attached considerable weight to these interests as the primary role of the Police Service is to both prevent and detect crime and apprehend those responsible for committing criminal offences.

Therefore, at this moment in time, there is no public interest in disclosing information that would increase the risk to public safety and harm policing capabilities.

If you need any further advice, please let us know

Kind regards



[\(Pronoun: she/her why have I put this?\)](#)

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs
Council
,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

* [REDACTED]

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

[REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
Subject: CRU reference - 25/5263/I OR 25/5253/G - Modern Slavery reports and outcomes - Including Advice
Date: 22 September 2025 12:56:52
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message. **Please note, this is 1 request which was incorrectly logged with 2 different reference numbers in the CRU– some forces will have one while others will have the other. This was an administrative error at our end. Please check both our references against your records.**

Our reference: 25/5263/I **OR** 25/5253/G

Referred by: All forces

Applicant's request:

1. Please provide the number of cases of modern slavery and human trafficking reported to the force for each calendar year between January 1st 2019 and December 31st 2024.

2. Please disaggregate data according to the following information:

The crime outcome of the offences (for example, this includes but is not limited to outcomes such as 'cautioned', 'charged/summonsed', evidential difficulties (victim does not support investigation), no suspect identified, 'Not in public interest (police)', Not in public interest (CPS)' and any other outcomes recorded),

3. The age of victims recorded, either adult (18 years or older) or child (17 years old or younger).

For the purposes of this request, 'victim' is a person who has reported having been a victim of this crime.

CRU Advice:

As with any request the first consideration should be cost. If to locate and retrieve all the requested information would exceed the cost limits of the act then s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine their request, if feasible to do so. If cost is not a factor then the following advice applies.

For any information already in the public domain from an official source, s21 can be cited.

For any other information disclosure can be considered subject to your own local assessment to ensure no individuals could be identified or ongoing investigations undermined.


Additionally, we have consulted with stakeholders due to the subject matter. They have advised a partial s23(5) NCND should be included within your response. We do not need to see your draft response.

Kind regards




National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to



and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999.

Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005287/Q - AI-enabled policing platforms - Request logged - Advice to Follow
Date: 16 September 2025 12:18:49
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005287/Q

Referred by: PSNI (FOI/15760)

Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I am writing to request information under the FOIA which relates to AI-enabled policing projects (including but not limited to machine learning, predictive analytics, or natural language processing) that have been in trial, development, or deployment at any point in 2025.

1) Copies of any portfolio, project listing, reports, presentations, or internal summaries relating to AI-enabled projects (including but not limited to machine learning, predictive analytics, natural language processing, or facial recognition technologies) that are currently in development, trial, or operation within this police force, or its associated ROCU.

2) Where available, details of:

- a) The name or description of each project
- b) The units or departments involved
- c) External collaborators (contractors, researchers, consultants, etc.)
- d) The intended purpose or application of the technology
- e) The status (e.g. research, pilot, deployment, discontinued)
- f) Any funding source (Home Office, NPCC, or other)

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]

Management Assistant

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

National Police Chiefs' Council

 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005296/R - National Centurion Data Request
Date: 17 September 2025 14:36:08
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

Good afternoon,

We have been notified by Wiltshire of a potential national FOI request for PSD data from Centurion. Please can you confirm if you are in receipt of this request by noon 18/09/25 or respond with a nil return so we can consider if this should be treated as a national request.

Date: 17/09/25

Applicant: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number.

Request:

1. How many misconduct hearings have there been for Wiltshire Police officers over the last 5 years?
2. How many misconduct hearings have there been for other Wiltshire Police members of staff over the last 5 years?
3. What are the outcomes for these misconduct hearings over the last five years for police officers and other members of staff?
4. How many of these officers have been sacked or dismissed after misconduct hearings?
5. How many of these officers have quit before their misconduct hearing?

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]

Management Assistant

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

National Police Chiefs' Council

 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

[REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: CRU ref: 25/5194/M - DVI - Including Advice
Date: 18 September 2025 13:59:06
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)
[image003.png](#)

Afternoon [REDACTED]

This advice is for 2025-829, I've saved it in the folder.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police HQ London Rd, Devizes SN10 2DN

Email

Phone

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



WILTSHIRE POLICE

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 18 September 2025 13:25
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5194/M - DVI - Including Advice

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5194/M

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

I would like to request the following information relating to Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) provision within your force.

- Where possible, please provide total counts disaggregated by gender where this information is recorded. I generally expect yes/no responses, but any additional context would be gratefully appreciated.
- 1. Staffing and Deployment
 - * The number of officers/staff currently trained in DVI within your force (please indicate gender if recorded).
 - * The number of DVI-trained officers/staff deployed in the last five years, and the categories of incidents they were deployed to (please group as: terrorism, transport incidents, industrial accidents, and natural disasters) - total numbers only, to preserve anonymity.
 - * Which department or unit within the force is responsible for DVI planning and deployment.
 - * The typical length of service an officer/staff member remains active on the DVI roster once trained (e.g., average number of years, or whether there is a set term).
 - * Whether your force applies any suitability checks or criteria prior to deployment of DVI-trained officers (e.g., health, psychological readiness, or operational availability).

CRU Advice:

-

Following consultation with the policing lead, we have been advised that this request is likely to exceed the cost limits of

the act. Question 2 specifically asks for information which the national leads feel will not be held in a readily retrievable format. To locate and retrieve all this information, a manual check of every incident will be required to establish if DVI trained officers have been deployed and further, how many. Given the scope of incidents to which a DVI trained officer may be deployed and the timeframe of the request, it is felt that this manual review will exceed 18 hours of work and thus s12 will be applicable. As all questions in the request are on materially similar subject matter, where s12 applies to one question it can be applied to the request as a whole.

At this stage we therefore advise s12 is relevant. In providing this response, we recommend you offer advice and assistance where you see fit.

If s12 is not relevant to your force, please provide us with the information you hold and any comments from your force teams on suitability for disclosure and we will then refer back to the policing lead for further views. In this instance, and given further consultation will be required, we recommend you PIT extend the request where possible. A form of words is below if it assists.

PIT wording:

'The FOI Act obliges a public authority to respond to requests promptly and in any case no later than 20 working days after receiving your request. The first consideration is whether we can comply with s1(1)(a) of the Act, which is our duty to confirm whether or not the information requested is held, secondly we must comply with s1(1)(b), which is the provision of such information. However, when a qualified exemption applies either to the confirmation, or denial or to the information itself, and the public interest test is engaged, section 17(2) of the Act allows the time for responding to be extended to longer than 20 working days, if the balance of such public interest is yet to be determined.

In this case we have not yet reached a decision on where the balance of the public interest lies in respect of either of the above obligations. We estimate that it will take an additional [xx] days to take a decision on where this balance lies. Therefore, we plan to let you have a response by [date]. If it appears that it will take longer than this to reach a conclusion, you will be kept informed.

The specific exemption(s) which apply in relation to your request is/are: [include a brief explanation of why it/they apply unless it is not apparent or unless you are not required to do so by virtue of s17(4)].

Insert usual complaint information.'

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

✉ NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

✉ [Redacted]

☎ [Redacted]



Q1 - When we consulted with policing leads in 2021, it was agreed that the total number of DVI trained officers per force was not suitable for release and should be withheld to protect tactical capability. Having re-checked with UKDVI, this remains the case. This question therefore requires exemption by virtue of s31(1)(a)(b). A form of words can be found at the end of this advice.

Q2 – The applicant asks for the number of DVI trained officers deployed over a 5-year period, further they request a breakdown of these numbers by incident type.

I think it is likely there would be public acknowledgment and/or media coverage for any incident of the scale for which DVI trained officers were required to attend, so the risk in providing a generic list of incident categories attended by DCI officers in general over a 5-year period (with no dates, total number of incidents or further information about them) would not seem particularly harmful.

However, in terms of providing the number of officers deployed,

Further providing this broken down by incident type:

In terms of providing the total number of DVI trained officers who have attended each category (as a total over 5 years for each), although harm seems somewhat mitigated because it does not ask about individual deployments, considering the approach taken to Q1 and the fact disclosed figures would represent the level of DVI officer deployment at *different types of incident* (which could be argued to reveal operational capability) do you believe exemptions should be applied to officer numbers deployed to each incident category? If you do, we would appreciate your reasoning for this and rationale in as much detail as possible so we can formulate accurate advice to all forces. If you do not feel it is harmful to disclose these figures against the list of incidents, perhaps because it represents past deployments, or the number of officers deployed to an incident is dynamic and case by case not formulaic, then we would be grateful for that confirmation also.

Q3 – We see no specific harm in answering this question.

Q4 – The applicant asks for the “typical” length of service of a DVI officer. Such information is not likely to be held as recorded information and so a NIH response should be provided.

Q5 – Overall we cannot see harm in providing a response, however we recommend forces locally assess what is held to ensure no operational sensitivities are captured.

Wording - [2021/24282 - DVI | Gwent Police, foi-2021-563_disaster-victim-identification.pdf](#), [Disaster Victim Identification - 566/2021 | Dyfed-Powys Police](#),

S31 Harm and PIT wording

Evidence of Harm:

The police service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The release of any operational capability in terms of numbers of trained DVI personnel could undermine that position. Whilst not questioning the motives of any one applicant that may request this information, it must be appreciated that a release under FOI is a disclosure to the world.

DVI is a specialism held by many police forces across the country, in numbers sufficient that in the event of a disaster on the largest scale that sufficient DVI trained personnel can respond.

However, disclosure of the exact number of DVI trained personnel currently in the force would undermine operational capability, providing those that would seek to commit criminal acts, information as to the current police DVI resources

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

📍NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS



■ [REDACTED]



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: CRU ref: 25/5334/G - Your ref: FOI 2025/912 - Palantir - Advice to Follow
Date: 29 September 2025 15:41:31
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU. Advice will follow in due course.

Our reference: 25/5334/G
Referred by: Wiltshire Police
Sent from: [REDACTED]

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I am requesting disclosure of information held by Wiltshire Police in relation to any dealings with Palantir Technologies UK Ltd or Palantir Technologies Inc.

- Specifically, I am requesting the following:
 1. .Copies of any contracts, memoranda of understanding, or agreements with Palantir since 1 January 2018.
 2. .Details of any procurement processes in which Palantir participated, including tenders or bids.
 3. .Records of any payments made to Palantir (amounts, dates, purposes).
 4. .Records of meetings (agendas, minutes, attendance lists, notes) between Wiltshire Police staff and Palantir representatives since 1 January 2018.
 5. .Copies of correspondence (emails, letters, briefings, reports, presentations) exchanged between Wiltshire Police and Palantir in the same period.
 6. .Any documents (policies, DPIAs, internal guidance) relating to the use of Palantir technologies by Wiltshire Police.
 7. .Details of any oversight or review mechanisms concerning the use of Palantir's services.

If any of this information is exempt from disclosure, please release what you can in partial form. If the request is likely to exceed cost limits, please advise me on how to refine it.


I would prefer to receive the information electronically, via email.

Thank you for your assistance. I look forward to your response within 20 working days.

If any of this information is exempt from disclosure, please release what you can in partial form.
If the request is likely to exceed cost limits, please advise me on how to refine it.

I would prefer to receive the information electronically, via email.

Kind regards



National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

📍 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999.
Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
Subject: CRU reference - 25/5327/H - PAG Guidance - Including advice
Date: 29 September 2025 12:08:31
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)
[CRU reference Numbers - 255054B 255056D 255065E 255101R - Guidance for Palestine Action - Including Advice.msg](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior
authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. We have assumed the request has gone to
all forces. You do not need to notify us that you have had this request.

Our reference: 25/5327/H

Referred by: All Forces

Applicant's request:

I would like to request all documents and information related to any guidance, training and
relevant supporting documents provided to or created by your police force following 5 July
2025, as well as all internal guidance or training delivered by your force as it relates to:

- The policing of the protests in support of Palestine Action or against the proscription of
this body, and;
- Online or offline support of the body.

CRU Advice:

Recent advice was circulated regarding guidance regarding PAG proscription - CRU ref:
5056/D (attached). This request may not capture everything captured and commented on
in 5056/D, but that advice will provide you with our advice on local assessment as well as
the position on any national documents you identify as captured here.

If you require anything further, please refer to the CRU.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

📍 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

✉ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FOI 2025/912 - Referral
Date: 26 September 2025 14:50:58
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[Referral_912.docx](#)

Hello,

Please see the attached referral form, reference FOI 2025/912.

If you need anything further please let me know.

Kind Regards,

[REDACTED]
Principal Decision Maker

Force Disclosure Unit

Wiltshire Police HQ
Devizes

Email:

[REDACTED]

Phone:

[REDACTED]



**WILTSHIRE
POLICE**

Keeping Wiltshire Safe

www.wiltshire.police.uk | [facebook/wiltshirepolice](https://facebook.com/wiltshirepolice) | [x/wiltshirepolice](https://x.com/wiltshirepolice)
| [LinkedIn/company/wiltshirepolice](https://linkedin/company/wiltshirepolice)

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: FOI Query - Palestine Action Policing Costs & Arrests
Date: 12 September 2025 09:04:49
Attachments: [image001.png](#)

Good morning,

Please disregard my email from yesterday - a colleague has found the 'advice to follow' email saved to her task folder (not regarding Palestine Action)!

I will await the advice.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
FDU Decision Maker [REDACTED]

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police HQ London Rd, Devizes SN10 2DN

Email

Phone



WILTSHIRE POLICE

Keeping Wiltshire Safe

| [facebook/wiltshirepolice](https://facebook.com/wiltshirepolice) | [x/wiltshirepolice](https://twitter.com/wiltshirepolice) | [LinkedIn/company/wiltshirepolice](https://www.linkedin.com/company/wiltshirepolice)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 11 September 2025 14:04
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FOI Query - Palestine Action Policing Costs & Arrests

Good afternoon,

I am actioning the below FOI request regarding Palestine Action policing costs and arrests, and I have included my proposed response in red.

Since July 5th 2025 until the date that this request is received, how much has been spent on policing protests directly linked to Palestine Action?

This would be policed from duty strength, therefore no additional cost to the Force.

Since July 5th 2025 until the date that this request is received, how many cumulative days have people arrested for supporting Palestine Action (under Terrorism Act 2000) spent in custody suites?

Zero - no arrests

Since July 5th 2025 until the date that this request is received, how many people arrested for supporting Palestine Action (under Terrorism Act 2000) have been:

- Released without bail
- Released with bail
- Charged
- Remanded in custody

N/A

I do not believe there would be any harm in confirming the above, as I cannot find anything in the public domain regarding protests in Wiltshire. However, I just wanted to see whether you felt like there would be any issues in stating there have been zero arrests.

I look forward to hearing from you.

All members of the Force Disclosure Unit are working from home and are each going into the office on an ad-hoc basis. As a result, there may be a delay in responding to any postal requests and therefore we would like to apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
FDU Decision Maker [REDACTED]

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police HQ London Rd, Devizes SN10 2DN

Email [REDACTED]
Phone [REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FOI regional meeting chairs
Date: 19 September 2025 16:38:29
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

Hi all,

I'd be grateful if you could let me know who your FOI regional meeting chairs are please, so [REDACTED] can get in touch regarding scheduling meetings.

South West have already provided date(s).

Many thanks,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council
 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]



This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

[REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FSG - ICO item
Date: 02 September 2025 10:35:18
Attachments: [image001.jpg](#)
[image002.png](#)
[image003.png](#)

Morning all

I hope the summer has treated you all well, whether you've managed some time off or enjoyed the nice weather (shockingly!)

FSG is next week 10th and agenda will be shared shortly.

I can confirm the ICO are dropping in, therefore could I ask, for any topics you would like covered or questions you have so I can pass these along in advance which hopefully means you will get some prompt responses.

Warm regards



(Pronoun: she/her [why have I put this?](#))

[REDACTED]
Head of National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
[REDACTED]

Staff Officer to A/CC [REDACTED], NPCC Portfolio Communications and Media



[Book time with](#) [REDACTED]

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
Subject: Invitation to Free FOI & SAR Practitioners Workshop – Hosted by NPFDU
Date: 12 September 2025 11:05:55
Attachments: [image002.jpg](#)
[image004.png](#)
[image006.png](#)
Importance: High

Dear colleagues,

At NPFDU, we recognise the value of continuous professional development and are proud to regularly host our Practitioners Conference for forces across the country.

This year, I was keen to offer something more focused—a dedicated one-day workshop specifically for our FOI and SAR practitioners. The aim is to create space for deeper discussion and practical exploration of key issues affecting our work.

While I had hoped to deliver this event at no cost, it proved challenging to secure a hosting police force. Fortunately, eCase kindly stepped in to sponsor the workshop, allowing us to run it in collaboration and keep it free of charge for attendees, bar travelling costs.

To be clear, this is not an endorsement of eCase (NPFDU uses a different case management system), but their ongoing support for FOI and SAR professionals—including free training and their annual FOI conference—made this partnership possible.

We warmly invite you to take advantage of this opportunity. NPFDU looks forward to welcoming colleagues from across our policing teams for a day of learning, sharing, and connection.

If you haven't already, please secure your place at next month's workshop—we'd love to see you there. Please do forward on to the appropriate teams. Details below:

Secure Your Spot – Police FOI & SAR Workshop

Join fellow Police FOI and SAR practitioners this October for a full-day, hands-on workshop in Birmingham, delivered by the NPFDU and supported by eCase.

This event is built for you. Tackle complex requests. Learn practical ways to improve response times. Share, learn, and collaborate with peers from forces across the UK.

What's in Store:

- **Interactive sessions** on AI, personal data, deceased persons, and managing burden (vexatious/manifestly unfounded)
- **Roundtable discussions** on boosting performance and tackling blockers
- **1:1 eCase clinics** on performance tools, including how to use AI safely and securely
- **Meet the team at NPFDU** ask us questions and get to know who is on the other side of the emails

Event Details:

- **Date:** Thursday, 23rd October 2025
- **Time:** 9:15 AM – 4:30 PM (followed by a drinks reception until 5:30 PM)
- **Venue:** *The Studio, Central Birmingham*
- **Cost:** Free
- **Tickets:** 3 per force initially (waiting list available)

Places are filling fast - **reserve your spot today to ensure you don't miss out.**

[Book your place](#)

Warm regards



(Pronoun: she/her [why have I put this?](#))

Head of National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

[Redacted text]

Staff Officer to A/CC [Redacted], NPCC Portfolio Communications and Media



[Book time with](#) [Redacted]

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [Redacted] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
Subject: OS - CRU 25/5320 CSE data
Date: 25 September 2025 07:00:59
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU on 24/9/25. **Please let us know if you have received it.**

Initial advice is below.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005320/A
Referred by: Gwent
Applicant: [REDACTED]

Applicant's request:

Primary request: record-level dataset

Please provide record-level (row-by-row) data for all CSE-related crimes in your force area for each calendar year 2010–2024 inclusive (and 2025 year-to-date if available).

A) Scope / definition

- *Confirm the operational definition of “Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE)” and whether you use a CSE flag/marker.*
- *If no CSE flag exists, please state which Home Office offence codes or crime classifications you use to identify CSE offences (e.g., grooming, arranging/facilitating child sexual offences, sexual communication with a child, controlling child prostitution/indecency, etc.).*

B) Requested dataset fields (record-level, anonymised)

For each relevant record, please include:

- *Year of offence/record*
- *Crime classification/offence code*
- *Outcome code (Home Office outcome type, with description if available)*
- *Arrest made (Y/N)*
- *Suspect sex (M/F/Other/Unknown)*
- *Suspect ethnicity (classification used by force)*
- *Suspect nationality (if recorded; if not, state “not recorded”)*
- *Suspect religion (if recorded; if not, state “not recorded”)*
- *CPS referral (Y/N)*
- *CPS charging decision (if recorded by police)*

C) Format

- *Please supply data in machine-readable CSV with a data dictionary (field definitions, code lists, outcome descriptions).*
- *Remove any direct personal identifiers (names, DOB, addresses, case numbers).*

Fallback request: aggregated data

If providing the above record-level dataset would:

- *exceed the s.12 cost limit,*
- *or be refused under s.40 (personal information) or s.31 (law enforcement),*

then please instead provide annual aggregated totals for 2010–2024 (and 2025 YTD):

1. Number of recorded crimes meeting your CSE definition.
2. Outcomes for those crimes by Home Office outcome type.
3. Number of arrests of suspects, broken down by:
 - o Sex (M/F/Other/Unknown)
 - o Ethnicity (force's classification)
 - o Nationality (if recorded)
 - o Religion (if recorded)
4. Number of CPS referrals for charging decisions.
5. CPS charging decisions recorded by police (Charge/Alternative charge/No further action/Out of court/etc.).

Assistance

- If full coverage from 2010 is not available, please provide data from the earliest year held.
- If any field is not held, please confirm explicitly (s.1(1)(a)).
- If partial data is possible, please release what you hold and advise under s.16 how to refine further.

I confirm I am requesting only non-identifiable information for research purposes

CRU Advice:

The start of the request is for a definition of CSE, and we suspect forces will be using the definition as can be found via the College of Policing at [Responding to child sexual exploitation | College of Policing](#).

Next, the applicant is asking for single record data across annual periods from 2010 onwards, which is likely to result in most forces establishing this to be excess Cost under s12.

But further down the request the applicant addresses that s12 will be the likely outcome and provides a refined request, which is still likely to exceed Cost even though they require aggregated data as opposed to single record data.

However, putting excess Cost to one side, practitioners would need to locally assess the data and determine whether it is capable to leading to the identification of any individual, or would otherwise compromise a live investigation if given out (sections 40 and 31 respectively).

Overall, in the event s12 is not relevant, please let us know if we can assist you further. We welcome sight of any draft responses where disclosure is being considered so we can understand how the data might look. But at present we are not suggesting a partial NCND s23(3). However, this may well be taken into further consideration.

Kind regards,


Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council
✉ NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

✉ 



	
---	---

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

[REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999.

Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Our Ref FOI 2025/873
Date: 17 September 2025 12:49:11
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image003.png](#)
[Online form submission FOI-24135-25-5400-000.msg](#)
[FOI 2025-873 Modern slavery and human trafficking.pdf](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Good morning [REDACTED],

Thank you for your email. We have already received this request in from another force also. It is logged in the CRU under 5263/I. We will add you to receive the advice in due course.

Kind Regards

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(Pronoun: she/her [why have I put this?](#))

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

[REDACTED]

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 17 September 2025 09:00
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Our Ref FOI 2025/873

Good morning,

I am sorry to bother you when I know you are busy.

I've had an FOI in regarding modern slavery and human trafficking. I can see that previous similar requests have had CRU advice.

I have attached the original request and my proposed response – I have not had any indication that CRU is aware of this request. Please can you let me know if you did receive it but Wiltshire haven't filed the advice sent?

Many thanks for your time.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]

Force Disclosure Decision Maker

Force Disclosure Unit

Police HQ, London Road, Devizes, SN10 2DN

Email [REDACTED]

Phone [REDACTED]

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to

[REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

NPFDU CRU Referral Guidance and Form

In order for the NPFDU CRU to deliver its remit, forces and partners must refer certain requests so the unit can centrally assess. Please carefully read the following to allow the team to respond as promptly and as accurately as possible.

All mandatory referrals and requests for specific disclosure advice must come via a completed referral form emailed to [REDACTED] Please note incomplete forms will be returned.

- Mandatory referrals take priority and will be prioritised over general advice questions. The unit must ensure mandatory referral advice is in line with national guidance and respond promptly to enable forces to do similar.
- In addition to these mandatory referrals, any FOI/EIR requests that require specific disclosure and/or technical advice can be sent to the above email address with a completed form.
- Once an FOI referral has been received, we will generate an e-mail which will confirm its URN. This message may also contain further instructions which must be complied with before further guidance can be issued.
- Any request referred must **not** be answered until a final response has been received from the NPFDU CRU, unless otherwise stated from the team. If your force is considering making a disclosure prior to advice being issued or if it does not intend to follow national guidance, please make contact as soon as possible.
- The team aim to respond within the SLA of 10 working days, if the team are unable to, you will be notified. The team cannot prioritise a referral because it has been sent in late from a force. Please use our drop in sessions if appropriate.

Please note some additional questions have been added to the referral form below. It is important these are answered in as much detail as possible. If not, or left blank, the team will return the form and ask for further information before responding. This will assist the NPFDU in providing informative, consistent and accurate advice in a timely manner and to prevent delays to our service.

It is encouraged that general advice on the referral process or a simple FOI/EIR technical query is best resolved via a call to the team on [REDACTED] (works via MS Teams also) or attend a weekly drop in session on Tuesday or Thursday anytime between 11am-1130am via this MS Teams Link.

[Join the meeting now](#)

Meeting ID: [REDACTED]

Passcode: [REDACTED]

The Team may still request a referral form after initial consultation.

Mandatory Referrals-By Subject Area	
Subject	Further Detail
Witness protection/protected persons.	Ultra high risk subject area which must be referred to CRU.
Requests which name and/or relate to information which MAY originate from any of the S23 bodies.	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Covert operations, use of informants or surveillance activities or tactics.	Ultra high risk subject area which must be referred to CRU.
New programmes or software products such as Data Platforms/systems/tools for operational purposes.	Requests relating to operational products (whether being piloted, trialled or implemented or not), including engagement with new software companies that predominately handle big data such as 'Briefcam', 'Palantir'. Referrals are not required for back office functions such as AI Chatbot, crime prediction tools etc. If known please inform the CRU of the operational context of the product e.g. AI analysing digital evidence
Counter terrorism (incl Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare) and/or national security material or operations.	Includes SB, CTU, CBRN, port or airport operations, Crowded Spaces and ANPR.
VIP/Royalty Protection.	To include high profile Royal events and visits.
Information received from or which relates to certain partner agencies. <i>Referral only required once established information is captured by the request.*</i>	Includes NPCC, any government department, IOPC, CPS and College of Policing.
Major or complex incidents or major investigations or operations.*	Examples such as extremist protests, <u>large</u> scale public disorder, multiple or high profile unexplained deaths, cross border incidents. Will also include national operations and Inquiries. Please contact the CRU if unsure. <i>Local investigations/operations do not need referring.</i>
International Relations	Includes international training, visiting overseas dignitaries & FCO equities where s27 may be engaged.
National Security	Requests requiring s24 will need stakeholder consideration
Notification of ICO complaint, First Tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal activity	
Requests with potentially significant reputational implications, e.g. the storage of human tissue.	Where national policing leads would welcome the opportunity to comment on high profile matters (if unsure please contact the CRU)
Requests for information held for the purpose of a statutory Inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005	Examples – UCPI, Manchester Arena, Death of Dawn Sturgess, Grenfell

***If a request is captured by previous NPFDU guidance within the past 12 months, then no referral is required.**

Temporary Mandatory Referrals	
Subject	Date added
[REDACTED]	23/07/25
[REDACTED]	23/07/25

[REDACTED]	15/05/25
[REDACTED]	
[REDACTED]	
[REDACTED]	
[REDACTED]	06/03/25
[REDACTED]	26/02/25

There is no requirement to refer if the information requested is already officially published 'Officially published' includes, MAPPA reports and websites such as OSC, The College of Policing, NPCC, Government, IOPC, PCC, Police.UK or Force websites, or documents already marked as suitable for publication under FOIA 2000.

NPFDU CRU Referral Form

PLEASE COMPLETE ALL THE BELOW FIELDS TO ENSURE ACCURATE & TIMELY ADVICE, IT IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. THANK YOU

Force reference number:	FOI 2025/912
Date request received:	24/09/25
Type of request:	Initial ☒ Internal ☐ Review Appeal ☐ Tribunal ☐ (delete as appropriate) If at IR or appeal stage please provide sight of previous responses and requestors comments.
Applicants Name for reference	██████████
Actual wording of request	Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I am requesting disclosure of information held by Wiltshire Police in relation to any dealings with Palantir Technologies UK Ltd or Palantir Technologies Inc. - Specifically, I am requesting the following: .Copies of any contracts, memoranda of understanding, or agreements with Palantir since 1 January 2018. .Details of any procurement processes in which Palantir participated, including tenders or bids. .Records of any payments made to Palantir (amounts, dates, purposes). .Records of meetings (agendas, minutes, attendance lists, notes) between Wiltshire Police staff and Palantir representatives since 1 January 2018. .Copies of correspondence (emails, letters, briefings, reports, presentations) exchanged between Wiltshire Police and Palantir in the same period. .Any documents (policies, DPIAs, internal guidance) relating to the use of Palantir technologies by Wiltshire Police. .Details of any oversight or review mechanisms concerning the use of Palantir's services. If any of this information is exempt from disclosure, please release what you can in partial form. If the request is likely to exceed cost limits, please advise me on how to refine it. I would prefer to receive the information electronically, via email. Thank you for your assistance. I look forward to your response within 20 working days. If any of this information is exempt from disclosure, please release what you can in partial form. If the request is likely to exceed cost limits, please advise me on how to refine it. I would prefer to receive the information electronically, via email.

Reason for referral	Mandatory – New programmes or software products such as Data Platforms/systems/tools for operational purposes.
Specific advice required	<i>Assistance as it is a mandatory referral and other forces may have also received it.</i>
Is it a valid request (S8)	Yes
Do you know what information you hold? Please provide as much detail as possible. Is the information retrievable within 18 hours, is s12 a consideration?	<i>Not at this stage but Palantir has previously been NCND.</i> YES: ☐ NO: ☒ - I wouldn't have thought to gather all correspondence since 2018 would be retrievable within the 18 hour work limit.
What views and opinions are held by the FOI team and Business leads?	<i>From an FOI point of view I would imagine this would be exempt under Section 12</i> <i>Business Leads have not been contacted yet</i>
Person dealing with request and contact number:	

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Centurion / FIS FOI - FDU Ref: FOI 2025-896
Date: 17 September 2025 15:25:08
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)
[image003.png](#)

Hi [REDACTED]

That is not a problem, thank you for confirming.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
FDU Decision Maker [REDACTED]

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police HQ London Rd, Devizes SN10 2DN

Email [REDACTED]

Phone [REDACTED]



WILTSHIRE POLICE

Keeping Wiltshire Safe

| [facebook/wiltshirepolice](https://facebook.com/wiltshirepolice) | [x/wiltshirepolice](https://x.com/wiltshirepolice) | [LinkedIn/company/wiltshirepolice](https://linkedin.com/company/wiltshirepolice)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 17 September 2025 15:24
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Centurion / FIS FOI - FDU Ref: FOI 2025-896

Hi [REDACTED]

This is just to update you that your previously referred 'centurion' request is not currently being considered as a national case as other forces have not received it.

Please proceed with dealing with it in your usual way. Should this change we will notify you.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Management Assistant
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs' Council
✉ [NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS](#)



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 17 September 2025 11:32
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Centurion / FIS FOI - FDU Ref: FOI 2025-896

Good morning,

I have been allocated the attached FOI relating to misconduct hearings.

Please can you let me know if this is a national request? I have emailed our PSD department to let them know this has been queried, so they know to look out for this if it is.

I look forward to hearing from you.

All members of the Force Disclosure Unit are working from home and are each going into the office on an ad-hoc basis. As a result, there may be a delay in responding to any postal requests and therefore we would like to apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
FDU Decision Maker [REDACTED]

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police HQ London Rd, Devizes SN10 2DN

Email [REDACTED]
Phone [REDACTED]



WILTSHIRE POLICE	
Keeping Wiltshire Safe	
facebook/wiltshirepolice x/wiltshirepolice LinkedIn/company/wiltshirepolice	

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: CRU reference: 25/5078/J - Guidance for Palestine action, Hama, Houthi & Hezbollah - Including advice
Date: 02 September 2025 07:19:15
Attachments: [image004.png](#)
[image005.png](#)
[image006.png](#)
[image007.png](#)

Good morning [REDACTED],

Thank you for getting back to me in [REDACTED] absence.

I had not considered information held by Specialist Ops for their own use, so I will query this with them.
Thank you for confirming the use of NIH, if applicable, and for running through the (untenable) alternative of an NCND.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
FDU Decision Maker [REDACTED]

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police HQ London Rd, Devizes SN10 2DN

Email [REDACTED]
Phone [REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 01 September 2025 09:49
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: CRU reference: 25/5078/J - Guidance for Palestine action, Hama, Houthi & Hezbollah - Including advice

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU
Hi [REDACTED],

Thank you for your email. [REDACTED] is away today so I am responding in her absence.

Q2 asks for information "used" or "published". To my mind this does not limit it to information internally circulated, and could instead include information held by the Spec Ops Dept for their own use.

Is that something that has been considered?

However, in the event that Wiltshire determines that no information is held, I don't see an alternative to that response. As you will know, you cannot exempt information if you don't hold it, which leaves the only other alternative of NCND. For Q2 I would suggest NCND is untenable and that it would be at odds with other forces that hold information even if it is exempt information.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council
NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS
[REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 29 August 2025 16:10
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: CRU reference: 25/5078/J - Guidance for Palestine action, Hama, Houthi & Hezbollah - Including advice

Good afternoon,

I was just wanting to seek advice regarding question 2 of this request.

I have been informed by our Specialist Operations department that we have not circulated anything internally specifically regarding these groups (Hamas etc) since July 2024. Can I just confirm if you can see any harm in stating this within the response letter? My initial thoughts are that I cannot see any harm, however I was not sure if there would be any thoughts from a national perspective (in terms of keeping responses uniform etc).

I look forward to hearing from you.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]
FDU Decision Maker [REDACTED]

Force Disclosure Unit
Wiltshire Police HQ London Rd, Devizes SN10 2DN

Email [REDACTED]
Phone [REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 22 August 2025 14:14
Subject: CRU reference: 25/5078/J - Guidance for Palestine action, Hama, Houthi & Hezbollah - Including advice

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU
Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message. **We do not need to see final drafts unless you are NOT following advice.**

Our reference: 25/5078/J
Referred by: All Forces

Applicant's request:

1. Please provide copies of all documents, PowerPoint presentations, and/or guidance materials regarding the

identification of support for "Palestine Action".

a. I note that a document was disclosed (<https://www.met.police.uk/foi-ai/metropolitan-police/disclosure-2024/july-2024/instructions-tackling-hate-speech-actions-hamas-supporters-marches/>) by the Metropolitan Police regarding "instructions about tackling the hate speech and actions by HAMAS supporters on the marches." I am seeking similar, equivalent, and/or updated documents that may include mention of "Palestine Action".

b. Please also disclose documents related to this that may have been delivered to the police constabulary from the Home Office, Counter Terrorism Policing, or other organisations. Please disclose from which organisation the document originated.

2. Please disclose relevant documents related to the identification of Hamas, Houthi, and/or Hezbollah supporters that have been used/published since July 2024 (not including the one I included in the link above)

CRU Advice:

Question 1 a) and b)

I refer you to the advice provided for cases 25/5054/B, 25/5056/D, 25/5065/E, 25/5101/R circulated 22/08/25 and attached for ease of reference. Please note that the request is narrower than the others, and only asks for documents held in respect of "identification of support for "Palestine Action". As such, some documents captured on the CTPHQ list may not be captured for this request. Practitioners should review those documents and ONLY the ones which are captured for this particular request. Obviously there is advice on disclosure for all the CTPHQ documents on the attached advice (those requests are broader and thus capture all the NCTHQ documents) for you to refer to when formulating your response here.

Question 2

We have been notified by CTPHQ of only 1 document that was nationally circulated and is captured by the question. Views of NCTPHQ are as follows:

[REDACTED]

Disclosure advice: Nothing within this document is suitable for disclosure – therefore it is fully exempt s24(1) and s31(1).

Rationale – [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Regarding local documents, if any information within those documents has been extrapolated verbatim from the above national one, please ensure it is redacted from anything disclosure, citing the relevant harm. **There is no need to send us drafts/copies of these documents.**

For anything else contained within local documents or for documents only contain locally created information, then your own local assessment for any s24(1), s31(1) and s40(2) sensitivities can be undertaken. Please refer to the guidance on the attached for full explanations of advice on review of locally created documents captured here. **There is no need to let us know about these documents.**

Please refer to the bullet pointed harm and worded PIT from the attached advice to help guide you with your wording for this request – the above rationale for the national CT document is for your information only.

Kind regards

[REDACTED]

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

✉ NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

✉ [REDACTED]

	
---	---

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.

This email contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and any views or opinions expressed within are those of the originator and not necessarily those of the Force. If you are not the intended recipient(s) please note that any form of distribution, copying or use of this email or the information contained is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please forward a copy to [REDACTED] and to the sender. Please then delete the email and destroy any copies of it. DO NOT use this email address for other enquiries as it will not be responded to, nor any action taken upon it. If you have a non-urgent enquiry, please call the Police non-emergency number 101. If it is an emergency, please call 999. Thank you.
