

Force ELT – Wiltshire Police
Submission Report



Meeting	Force ELT
Date	01 February 2022
Report Title	Lacock Disorder Debrief.
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1.0 PURPOSE OF REPORT

- 1.1 This report has been prepared to provide a structured debrief of events relating to a disorder that occurred at LACOCK on Monday 27th December 2022 when the Avon Vale Hunt met, and hunt supporters clashed with protesters.

2.0 BACKGROUND

- 2.1 The debrief was commissioned by Supt DUNCAN to identify any organisational learning from events on 27th December and this has been achieved by splitting the debrief into two parts:
- a. Operational management of the police response to the incident in LACOCK.
 - b. Understanding the generic approach to hunt related issues at the Tactical level.
- 2.2 Although conducted by a College of Policing (CoP) trained debriefer the commissioning and presentation process do not completely follow CoP debrief guidelines and have been adapted to accommodate Covid restrictions in debriefing staff and to allow for completion of this report in the 'ELT submission report' format.
- 2.3 An initial briefing paper prepared by ACC SMITH was submitted to ELT on 3rd January and is attached to this report at Appendix A.
- 2.4 Information within this debrief report has been collated from the ACC's briefing paper along with [REDACTED], the occurrence relating to the investigation of offences, a range of internal email correspondence relating to the incident, individual debrief of officers involved and the results of a survey sent to key internal stakeholders.

Reference has also been made to the CoP Authorised Professional Practice (APP) for Public Order policing, European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) legislation and the Rural Crime Team (RCT) Terms of Reference (ToR) and Service Delivery plan.

Sources of information considered but not included within this debrief process are members of the hunting community, members of the protest community, suspects, and Injured Parties (I/Ps) of offences, residents of LACOCK, Wiltshire Council, Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) Salisbury Plain Team and the National Trust.

The rationale for excluding these sources is around time constraints and the requirement for the debrief to focus on events on 27th December.

3.0 DEBRIEF REPORT.

3.1 Summary of events.

On Monday 27th December 2022 the Avon Vale Hunt gathered for a hunt meeting in the village of Lacock. This was the annual Boxing Day Hunt which is described as ceremonial and involved about 20 members of the hunt dressed in full hunting regalia riding out in company with a pack of hounds. In addition to those actively participating in the hunt there were a number of 'hunt supporters' along with people from the local community present as spectators. Some of those supporting the hunt are likely to be linked to the hunt as 'terrier men' or trail layers and a very small number appear to have made efforts to conceal their identity by wearing scarves around their faces along with wearing hooded tops or hats. This is not entirely uncommon in the pro hunting community when it is suspected that anti-hunt protesters will be present as it assists in avoiding identification and publication of identity, addresses etc on anti-hunt social media sites.

The presence of the hunt in LACOCK had been publicised on social media sites linked to several anti-hunting groups along with requests for people to attend to protest the hunt. This has resulted in a comparatively small protest group (about 40 people) attending, some equipped with anti-hunting posters. Within this group were a few people (about 8) who had attended wearing full face coverings in an apparent effort to conceal their identity.

By 1020 hours on 27th there were approximately 250 people present congregating at the front of the Red Lion Pub, which was open and serving alcohol. Also initially in attendance was local Member of Parliament (MP) James GRAY.

Although some of the hunt protesters were holding signs displaying offensive language and there appears to have been some exchanging of insults between the opposing groups with the situation becoming heated, there were no physical clashes until the hunt has set off. There was then some pushing and shoving between the groups as hunt supporters tried to clear the way for the horses and this has resulted in a some 'flashpoints' where punches and drinks have been thrown.

Present on foot in the village were two police officers: Police Constable (PC) [REDACTED] and PC [REDACTED]. When they were made aware of the disorder they have intervened between the two groups. This has coincided with the hunt having moved off and tensions appear to have reduced quickly, with people moving away from the area.

However some of the disorder was filmed by people present and this has included the subsequent attendance of the two officers and their management of the people present. An obviously edited version of this footage has been quickly circulated by several anti-hunting groups via their social media channels and this has led to a significant volume of negative comments and complaints directed towards Wiltshire Police in relation to perceived pro hunt bias by Wiltshire Police and the officers present.

[REDACTED]

3.2 [REDACTED] management of risk in relation to the LACOCK protest.

It is clear that Wiltshire Police were aware of the meeting of the hunt at Lacock and the potential for protest [REDACTED].

As a result, information in relation to the hunt and anticipated protest was circulated quite widely within the force resulting in notification to the Force Specialist Operations Department on 22nd December. After review by Inspector (Insp) [REDACTED] (Force Operations Insp) and Police Sergeant (PS) [REDACTED], a Public Order Public Safety Advisor (POPSA), it was assessed that a formal command structure was not necessary or proportionate to the information [REDACTED] and the event should be managed by local Community Policing Teams (CPT). Scanning of available staff identified Protest Liaison Team (PLT) trained staff and the on call POPSA on duty on the 27th December with a notification to them of the potential for their services being required. Other key staff on duty on 27th December; Duty Superintendent (Supt), County Duty Inspector (CDI), The CPT Response PS at CHIPPENHAM (Station Code: EP) and the EP CPT Neighbourhood Insp [REDACTED].

A niche admin occurrence [REDACTED] was created and pinned to the Daily Management Meeting (DMM) for review on 23rd December, [REDACTED] and for any additional information identified to be managed by the Force Incident Manager (FIM) or Duty Superintendent. [REDACTED].

3.3 Resourcing of hunt related issues on 27th December.

Monday 27th December was a Bank Holiday in lieu of Christmas Day (due to Christmas Day falling on a weekend) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The notification on 23rd December to key personnel on duty on 27th December also appears to have left no time for any additional resources to be considered or arranged and some of the people that the information was flagged to were either providing temporary cover for posts or weren't actually working on 27th December due Christmas period leave/staffing. As a result, policing of the event was left with EP CPT staff on duty on 27th December.

On 27th December EP dayshift consisted of 1 + 4 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], this would have been in addition to any logs that had been deferred overnight and a requirement to deal with any handover files linked to persons in custody. Information in relation to the hunt was passed in shift briefing with a request from the Duty Sgt that officers patrol the area when available to provide a visible policing presence.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].
DMM were advised that a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and could confirm that it was going ahead in LACOCK.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

[REDACTED] was opened at 1019 Hrs to record police attendance at LACOCK. The log was closed at 1237 hrs with nothing of note recorded on it [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. The FIM and CDI were both made aware of the log.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

3.4 Operational management of the police response to the incident in LACOCK.

Insp [REDACTED] was on days as the FIM. She was aware of the potential for a protest at the hunt in LACOCK from the item pinned to and discussed at DMM. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Insp [REDACTED] is an officer with 20 years' experience but no public order training. She is aware of the policing of various Boxing day hunts in previous years but not recently.

A/Insp [REDACTED] was on days as the CDI and was aware of the information in relation to the hunt having received emails about it and from discussion at DMM. He had spoken to the EP Duty Sgt to ensure that staff were briefed for awareness and patrol, but a specific presence was not mandated due to resource limitations. A/Insp [REDACTED] was the sole Insp on duty in County, covering 7 different Sector areas and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) Insp role. A/Insp [REDACTED] has a lot of experience policing the EP area but is not public order trained. He is not aware of any specific policing presence at the Boxing Day Hunt in LACOCK in recent years.

PS [REDACTED] was the EP Duty Sgt on days and was aware of the potential for issues at the hunt as he had received emails in relation to it and from discussion with the CDI, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. He describes the shift as busy with numerous logs requiring attendance and his shift being under the minimum staffing level. He discussed the potential for a protest at the hunt in briefing and directed that staff attempt to provide a visible presence in the area when they were able to do so but a static presence was not tasked to any specific units. After being made aware of the creation of a log in relation to the hunt he moved a unit from EO to assist and specifically directed two officers to attend as soon as they were free from other commitments. PS [REDACTED] has nearly 20 years' service and has worked in the EP area since 2011. He is not public order trained and was not aware of any specific police attendance at the Boxing Day Hunt at LACOCK in recent years.

At 1019 Hrs [REDACTED] (PCs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]) contacted CCC to request a log as they had attended the LACOCK area and identified hunt protesters gathering. PC's [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are experienced officers, both having nearly 20 years' service and both

having previously been public order trained. PC [REDACTED] has some connection with the Avon Vale Hunt [REDACTED] and he has previously held a role of hunt liaison officer when he worked on EP section. These officers [REDACTED] had not been tasked to the area but were present as part of a routine patrol. On identifying protesters gathering and a risk of confrontation PC [REDACTED] has alighted from the vehicle to speak to persons gathered, leaving PC [REDACTED] with the vehicle away from the main gathering to avoid being blocked in. PC [REDACTED] has been dressed in non-reflective firearms uniform with his Self-Loading Pistol (SLP) overtly carried on his thigh. He did not have his Body Worn Camera (BWC) on as he didn't perceive any threat and he was conscious of battery limitations of the BWC if it was left running. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. PC [REDACTED] can recall that after the Hunting Act came into force in 2004 the Boxing Day Hunt at LACOCK had a dedicated police presence for several years but was not aware of any specific police attendance in recent years. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PC [REDACTED] has attended shortly after hearing [REDACTED] request that a log was created. She is not recorded on the log as attending, hadn't been specifically tasked and her supervisor wasn't aware of her attending. She had merely picked up on the instruction from briefing to pay attention to the hunt and was responding to information that there was potential for confrontation. PC [REDACTED] is a relatively new officer with only two years' service, [REDACTED]. She has recently completed public order training but does not have much experience of public order. [REDACTED]

From morning briefing her team had been instructed to provide a presence in the area and she attended to liaise with the [REDACTED] unit. On arrival she spoke to PC [REDACTED] to identify what

the situation was at which point both officers were about 100m away from the front of the Red Lion and the gathering of protesters and the hunt. Shortly after her arrival [REDACTED] [REDACTED] shouted to her from the front of the Red Lion advising that a fight had broken out. PCs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have then attended the front of the Red Lion where some of the groups of protesters and hunt supporters were confronting each other. They have then attempted to calm the situation. Both officers describe multiple people demanding that they take various actions and advising that a range of offences had been committed, including obstruction of the highway, illegal hunting, Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) and disorder. However, no one identified themselves as a victim of an assault or made any direct allegation. People shouting at the officers were advised to phone 101 to report any offences as it was recognised that with the limited police presence, preventing disorder was a priority over recording any allegations. It was clearly a relatively chaotic situation but both officers describe it calming quite quickly once the hunt moved off and people dispersed.

PC [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] can confirm that people in attendance were consuming alcoholic drinks but except for one individual no one appeared excessively under the influence of alcohol. Neither officer felt threatened at any point and when asked about the appropriateness of deploying into a disorder in a crowd whilst overtly carrying an SLP, PC [REDACTED] advised that he maintained a good level of situational awareness when attending General police Duties (GPD) incidents and at no point did he feel there was a risk from his deployment. Both officers are of the opinion that footage released via social media had been edited in a way that implied a closer police presence at the point of disorder and the reality of the situation has been exaggerated by this footage.

[REDACTED] PC [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] PC [REDACTED] are recorded as being tasked by CCC to attend at 1108 Hrs arriving at 1125 Hrs [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. PCs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] confirm they attended having been tasked by PS [REDACTED] to provide an additional presence due to the report of protesters being present. They arrived and parked on the High Street as Hunt participants were leaving the area on horseback. They confirm the street was crowded but did not see any disorder. They only became aware that there had been some issues when they were informed by PC [REDACTED]. They conducted a short foot patrol while people present dispersed.

No other logs were generated in relation to the disorder and there was no communication of any disorder on the radio from PCs [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. On reflection both PCs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] recognised that it would have been useful for them to have activated their BWC on arrival. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. In terms of debrief to Duty Sgt or CDI, both officers felt that there was nothing of significance to report and only became aware of any issues after they finished duty at 1500 Hrs and once they had become aware of the footage of the disorder that had been circulated.

3.5 Understanding the generic approach to hunt related issues at the Tactical level.

The majority of the information in this section of the report comes from review of niche and a survey of the following key internal stakeholders: C/Insp North, C/Insp South, Force Operations Insp, Rural Crime Insp, Rural Crime PS, D/Insp [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and D/Insp [REDACTED]. The anonymised results of this survey are attached at Appendix D.

The current process for identifying when hunts are meeting appears to be that officers from RCT obtain this information from liaison with members of the relevant hunts and advise the Force Operations Department of dates across the hunting season so these can be entered onto the force ops calendar. There is no specific risk assessment or resourcing in relation to these unless there is some [REDACTED] information to suggest it is required.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
this can result in several hunt meets a week with the vast majority attracting no police presence.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. RCT is a relatively small department [REDACTED] and the Ops Department do not have any specific operational resources outside of planned operations where a full command structure has been set up. CPT(N)s do not appear to currently have identified 'leads' on hunting, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The current Rural Crime Team Delivery Plan states:

*The hunting of live mammals with hounds is an emotive area. It often brings with it support, opposition and commentary from a wide spectrum of society, amplified by social media and various other platforms. **Whilst the RCT will deal with Hunting Act Offences it should be noted that public disorder arising from hunt meets or illegal hunts or trespass will be a Community Policing Team Neighbourhood responsibility with specialist departmental support where appropriate.** The RCT will be on hand to provide advice and guidance to CPTN OICs when required.* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

As a result of the disorder on 27th December, the next two hunts by the Avon Vale Hunt (1st and 8th January) received a dedicated police resource of 2 x double crewed GPD units and there were no further issues. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4.0 STAFFING ASPECTS

4.1 There are no staffing implications.

5.0 FINANCIAL ASPECTS

5.1 Additional staffing of Hunt Meetings on Bank Holidays will require an O/T budget if it cannot be resourced from available staff on duty.

5.2 [REDACTED]

6.0 LEGAL ASPECTS

6.1 The starting point for policing public protest is a presumption in favour of peaceful assembly and ECHR Articles 9, 10 and 11 form the basis of an individual's right to participate in peaceful protest. In certain circumstances, the police have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully. This applies where there is a threat of disruption or disorder from others. This does not mean that there is an absolute duty to protect those who want to protest, but the police must take reasonable measures in particular circumstances.

- 6.2 When weighing up our positive obligation to facilitate protest, ECHR Article 17: Prohibition of abuse of rights, should be closely considered with the Article stating:

Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.

Hunting within the restrictions of the Hunting Act 2004 (drag hunting or riding out) is a lawful activity and persons engaging in this activity have a right to do so free from interference or disruption, with police officers having to weigh up the conflicting rights of all those present when protest takes place.

7.0 SUSTAINABILITY / ENVIROMENTAL

- 7.1 There are no sustainability implications.

8.0 EQUALITIES IMPACT ASSESSMENT or DIVERSITY

- 8.1 An Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) has not been conducted in relation to this report.

9.0 RISK ASSESSMENT

- 9.1 A risk assessment has not been conducted in relation to this report.

10.0 CONTRIBUTION TO THE DRAFT WILTSHIRE AND SWINDON POLICE AND CRIME PLAN 2022-2025.

- 10.1 The implications associated with this report will contribute to the following priority area(s):

- i) Priority One - A police service that meets the needs of its communities.
- ii) Priority Two - Reduce violence and serious harm.
- iii) Priority Three - Tackle crimes that matter to local communities.
- iv) Priority Four - Improve the experience of victims and deliver justice.

- 10.2 Whilst this was a minor incident that was over quickly, LACOCK is a small rural village and this incident will have had a disproportionate impact to the community, compared to a disorder outside a football ground after a fixture, or a licensed premises within NTE policing. A large segment of the local community were present and the media coverage of the incident will have made residents that weren't present aware of it and the potential for similar incidents in the future. A Community Concern Assessment has not identified any significant issues at this time, but it is likely that this will require review at any anniversary event.

It is unfortunate that assaults occurred but the disorder itself is relatively minor and being appropriately investigated, but the fact that violence occurred with a risk of harm to the people present is contrary to Priority Two.

The main impact from the incident at LACOCK is the reputational damage to the force from the publication and circulation of social media content that suggests a bias by WiltsPol

towards groups engaging in unlawful hunting activity and this may undermine trust in WiltsPol within protest groups.

11.0 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

11.1 Conclusions:

- a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].
- b) The decision that a formal command structure or policing operation was **not** required for the Hunt in LACOCK was proportionate to the available information [REDACTED]. However, a small, but well briefed, dedicated resource (1 double crewed GPD unit and PLT engagement/presence) attending from pre-event and engaging with all parties present is likely to have prevented disorder breaking out.
- c) The footage of the incident released via social media is likely to have been intentionally edited to fulfil an anti-authority/police agenda. The extended version of the footage available on YouTube is 3 mins 50 secs in length. PC [REDACTED] features for 8 seconds and PC [REDACTED] for 14 seconds despite clearly having been present and involved for much longer. The release of this footage has been through social media sites where the sharing of footage is likely to have triggered algorithms that will have cascaded content to sites/individuals with an anti-police sentiment. This is likely to have disproportionately generated negative comments towards WiltsPol.
- d) PCs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have appropriately in attending LACOCK. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Both officers have acted with integrity and resolve within the structure and spirit of the Community Policing model.
- e) It is likely that Hunts in Wiltshire will continue to hunt (both lawfully and unlawfully) and this activity will continue to attract protest to it.
- f) The demonstration against the hunt was peaceful and violence was initiated by supporters of the hunt. This may impose a Human Rights Act obligation on WiltsPol to facilitate protest at future similar events.
- g) The involvement of a local MP with the Avon Vale Hunt, along with the previous PCC elect having also been a hunt master, may create reputational challenges for WiltsPol. Exactly as it is for our staff, some members of the community will be involved in rural pursuits. Where these people hold political positions that require interaction with WiltsPol, there could be allegations of bias and we will need to demonstrate absolute transparency and impartiality at all times.
- h) Research into this report has identified that the term 'sabs' (Hunt Saboteurs) is routinely used within WiltsPol. This appears to be in reference to people suspected of seeking to take

unlawful direct action to achieve their aims, but it has also been used about people choosing to protest against hunting lawfully and peacefully. This is likely to demonstrate a subconscious bias by WiltsPol against protest activity and could prove problematic in the event of any relevant documentation being disclosed publicly.

- i) There is not currently a clear process for commissioning PLT trained officers to engage with protest groups outside of a formal operation.
- j) The use of BWC is still not embedded as an instinctive action for all staff.
- k) There is a lack of clarity on which department should lead on liaison with hunt organisers.
- l) Currently there is no involvement from Wiltshire Council in this issue. Whilst some hunt meetings attract little attention and have limited impact, the Avon Vale Hunt on Boxing Day was a different matter and involved; alcohol, unauthorised obstruction of the highway, horses, children, and protesters. Although there are no licensable activities taking place, there may be a role for the Council to encourage the Hunt (as the event organiser) to formalise risk assessments and management of the event.
- m) There is a lack of clarity on which department should lead on liaison with protest groups.
- n) The RCT officers deployed on 26th December are likely to have been better utilised on duty on 27th December.
- o) The Policing of Hunt related protest has a number of similarities with the yearly National and Regional Operation Cobb activity. There may well be some 'best practice' and lessons learned from Op Cobb commanders, including those that we have in force. The best example of good practice that has developed around Op Cobb is clear responsibility for consistent communication between Police and the various groups involved, with contact with protest groups coming from an organised PLT structure and contact with landowners involved in the cull coming from Cull Liaison Officers (CLO) and then information provided being shared and reviewed and command level. This allows for communication with stakeholders to pass key messages and proposed 'tipping points' and allows the GPD officers allocated to the operation to focus on the policing of events and investigation of any offences without compromising any relationships that have been developed between PLT/CLO and their respective contacts.
- p) This report provides a number of conclusions and recommendations intended to identify options for best practice in the future. However, in an environment of conflicting demand and limited resources, recommendations should be considered in proportion to the incident and the likelihood of further similar events. Ultimately this was a minor disorder resulting in a small number of offences and some perceived reputational damage. Community impact appears limited and the frequency of events like this has been low over the last few years. However, protest is an ever-evolving area and now there appears to be a growth in popularity of various protest movements and at the heart of a lot of these groups, there remain people who are committed to political ideology and are prepared to use violence and commit offences to achieve their aims. Within the region over the last 18 months, we have seen significant protest around a range of issues including Brexit, Covid restrictions, 'Black Lives Matter', 'Reclaim the Streets' and 'Kill the Bill', amongst others. The riot at The Bridewell Police Station in Bristol appeared to have been spontaneous but the frustrations of those engaged in disorder had probably been developing over months and years. It would have been expensive for Avon and Somerset Police both in terms of cost and community engagement. Whilst central Bristol is culturally far removed from rural Wiltshire, geographically it is close [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

11.2 Recommendations:

- a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].
- b) There should be proactive engagement with Hunt organisers in relation to Boxing Day 2022 and [REDACTED], so Police engagement and management of all parties involved be considered well in advance of any relevant events. This process should be conducted with any of the hunts that attract a similar level of attention at their bigger meetings and there may need to be specific consideration of the final hunt meetings of this season in March if it is identified that any protest groups plan on attending.
- c) On conclusion of the investigation into the disorder there should be a clear and considered media strategy that seeks to target some of the social media platforms that circulated anti-police commentary by publicising any prosecutions arising from the investigation. WiltsPol will demonstrate transparency and impartiality and may be able to passively challenge the false narrative of Police bias in favour of hunting activity.
- d) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].
- e) In relation to the widespread use of the phrase 'sabs' to describe protest activity, the impact of doing this should be circulated via ebrieff encouraging supervisors to challenge and educate inappropriate language, with L and D ensuring this is also highlighted within force training.
- f) Force Ops should identify a PLT lead with responsibility for providing staff that can be tasked for engagement with protest groups outside of a formal operation. Given the nature of PLT engagement it would be useful to try and achieve consistency in relation to which officers contact which groups, rather than any functions being shared across the cohort. Ideally PLT will operate in pairs to provide constant points of contact and succession planning. PLT is an ancillary role so supervisors across the force will need to be aware of the additional demands on PLT staff in what is still a new and developing role. There should be a much clearer process of commissioning PLT engagement, so that CPT and intel leads can liaise with Force Ops staff to identify when PLT resources might be appropriate.
- g) The negative consequences of officers not utilising BWC at this incident should be publicised through appropriate lesson learned documentation and/or through ebrieff [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

- h) A suggested model for engagement and risk assessment for the 2022/2023 hunting season would be similar to the pre-season assessment of football fixtures, with an initial review and RAG rating process. This could be achieved by RCT obtaining all available hunting dates, [REDACTED] an update on the Force Ops calendar to highlight hunts that may require a policing response. Management of that response could sit with the relevant Sector Insp for the area the Hunt is taking place with discussion with Ops Planning and escalation to C/Insp if it is felt that a formal command structure, resourcing or an operation order are required. Responsibility for involvement of Wiltshire Council via an ESAG would then also sit with the Sector Insp.
- i) There should be guidance available to Sector Insp, FIMs and CDIs in relation to the police response to protest or disorder at Hunts. I am aware that a flow chart for the generic response to POPS issues has already been commissioned for and is in the process of being made available via the Ops Department.

12.0 SUITABLE FOR ONWARD SUBMISSION TO ELG (OPCC)?

Yes

13.0 OUTCOME / DECISION (This is for ELT use only)

13.1 Outcome / Decision to also be recorded on the meeting Decision Log.

13.2

Appendices:

- Appendix A: ELT Brief: Overview report following the Lacock Boxing day Hunt 2021. Submitted by ACC SMITH on 3rd January 2022.
- [REDACTED]
- Appendix C: Summary of information known by WiltsPol in relation to the potential for protest at LACOCK.
- Appendix D: Anonymised results of a survey of key internal stakeholders in relation to hunting and protest linked to hunting.